Conditional Cash Transfers and School Attendance

Flickr user: kinderpate

The World Bank released a paper last month looking at the effects of Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programs on school attendance in rural Burkina Faso. As I've looked at similar programs in Latin America, and am generally a proponent of such schemes, I thought I'd share a few interesting points.

CCTs have been growing in popularity throughout the developing world and especially in Latin America--particularly Mexico and Brazil. The idea behind these schemes is to develop long-term human capacity in the form of increased nutritional, health, and educational outcomes, and to break the inter-generational cycle of poverty that afflicts implementing countries.

The "Conditional" in the CCT theoretically has a number of benefits, both for donors and recipients. For donors, many have remarked that conditionalities make cash transfers (from governments to citizens) more palatable to politicians. On the other hand, conditionalities provide a mechanism by which recipients are incentivized to do things like send their kids to school (rather than work or beg) and get medical checkups and immunization for women and young children. Some programs have additional benefits such as providing female heads of household with increased independence or providing a source of income security that allows families to access credit or purchase durable goods (Abhifit Banerjee and Esther Duflo's book Poor Economics has a great section on the difficulties poor people face in accessing credit and the benefits of income security for development).

The World Bank study isolates one particular theoretical benefit of CCTs, and asks to what extent conditional versus unconditional cash transfers really increase school attendance. The results were interesting; CCTs and UCTs (unconditional...) had similar positive impacts on enrollment for "children who are traditionally favored by parents for school participation, including boys, older children, and higher ability children." These are children that parents may "prioritize" with regards to obtaining education; parents already want to send them to school. So, cash transfers--with or without conditionalities attached--help relieve the burden (or opportunity costs) of sending these kids to school.

Where the conditional transfers excelled however, was in improving enrollment of what the authors called "marginal children"--kids who are less likely than the first group to go to school, or who go to school less often. These include girls, younger children, and children with lower abilities. For these children, cash benefits led to a statistically significant increase in enrollment of over 20 percent for girls, 37 percent for younger children, and 36 percent for low ability children, compared to the average enrollment for these groups. UCTs, on the other hand, saw either a statistically insignificant increase in enrollment, or a much smaller enrollment for these groups.

In other words, CCTs seem to excel in encouraging school attendance among the most marginalized groups of marginalized populations, and provide a pretty good bang for the buck.

Keep in mind, these results obtain in Burkina Faso, a relatively small rural country in the West African Sahel. I would be interested to see a comparative look at CCTs in more urbanized countries, or geographically larger countries, for example. In addition, this study defines educational outcomes mostly in terms of enrollment and attendance; education observers in this country well know that educational outcomes rest on a variety of other factors, not the least of which include the quality of the schools and teachers or the availability of textbooks and classroom technology, for example. These elements generally lie within the supply side of the educational attainment equation, however, and it is becoming ever more apparent that CCTs at least have a strong and positive impact on the demand side of things.

First Fruits of the Brazilian Truth Commission

Brazil is learning startling truths about what took place during the country's period of military dictatorship (1964-1985). The president of Brazil's National Human Rights Commission (Comissão Nacional de Direitos Humanos) Wadih Damous, demanded this week that along with the thousands of politically motivated tortures that took place under military rule, abuse and torture of the children of prisoners be investigated.

This comes barely a week after the high profile suicide of Carlos Alexandre Azevedo, son of a well known Brazilian journalist. Azevedo was captured with his mother in 1974 and apparently abused by the jailers--to torture his watching mother--when he was not yet two years old. Azevedo suffered from numerous social and psychological traumas as a result of the abuse he suffered as a toddler, apparently never recovering. Other reports of the willingness of Brazilian authorities to abuse the children of suspected subversives have surfaced in recent months, though it is not yet clear if the practice was as systemic as the Argentinian corollary, where children were systematically taken from their parents (who were usually then killed) and given to be raised by members or friends of the ruling junta.

The National Truth Commission (Comissão Nacional da Verdade), established May of 2012, has been looking into disappearances, torture, rape, and other abuses that took place during Brazil's "dirty war" against suspected leftists and insurgents. On Monday, the Commission revealed that it had identified dozens of individuals--mostly military and police officials, but some civilians--who had been involved with certain atrocities.

The Commission has run into strong criticism though, as important segments of the public are strongly resistant to any digging around in the unpleasantries of the past. Many are simply too young or care too little about what they see as relatively minor abuses of a distant past. An estimated 500 individuals disappeared during the twenty year period, while another 9,000 were jailed and tortured in brutal crackdowns. The Commission estimates that approximately 50,000 were arrested in 1964--the first year of military rule--alone. Compare these numbers to the more spectacular horrors of Peru or Guatemala for example where nearly 70,000 and 200,000 were killed, respectively (or tiny Uruguay, where around 200 disappearances had a much more pervasive effect); much of Brazilian society--now a country of around 200 million--was relatively untouched by state violence during the period.

On the other hand, since Brazil passed a military amnesty in 1979 (which was upheld in 2010 by the Supreme Court), no prosecutions will result from the Commission's work. Still, the body hopes to name names, and to provide a deeper and clearer history of what actually happened during this dark period. And, digging up the truth is not just an academic exercise. The history, and especially the personal histories that emerge during this process (the Commission has a two year mandate) could have unimaginable consequences on Brazilian society and politics, not to mention the families and societies that lived them.

It will be interesting to see what the emergence of a (potentially) new collective knowledge and understanding of this period could do for the prospects for justice in Brazil. If the Commission does reveal atrocities or abuse that were, perhaps, more extensive or more heinous than generally accepted, could a civil-social groundswell provide the kind of political momentum to revisit the amnesty issue a la Uruguay and Argentina? Too soon to say, for sure. But, it seems a positive sign that Brazil is dealing with this difficult part of its past. Combined with last year's high-profile corruption scandal (Mensalão), which resulted in 35 convictions in a country that does nearly as well on corruption indexes as it does in the World Cup, the Truth Commission's first fruits, though devastatingly bitter, are a step forward.

Uruguay takes a step backwards on Human Rights

On Friday February 22, the Uruguayan Supreme Court put a stop to human rights trials stemming from that country's military dictatorship during the 1970s and 80s by calling a law that had turned over a 1986 amnesty unconstitutional.

The amnesty, passed by popular referendum in the years following Uruguay's return to democracy, was overturned in late 2011. The law, passed following an Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruling that declared Uruguay's amnesty in conflict with the country's treaty obligations, eliminated the statute of limitations on cases against former military and police officials alleged to be responsible for disappearances and other atrocities under the dictatorship.

However, the Supreme Court found this week that the 2011 law, passed by the president Jose Mujica's Broad Front (Frente Amplio) following several unsuccessful attempts to reverse the amnesty by referendum, to be unconstitutional. The finding, while not entirely unexpected, was widely denounced by human rights activists in Uruguay and beyond. President Mujica's party released a statement on its website denouncing the finding as an "obstacle in the search for truth and justice legitimately claimed by social organizations and victims of state sponsored terrorism."

Opponents of the decision vowed to take the fight against the amnesty law to the Inter-American Court, and to take legal action against the Supreme Court itself.

The finding affects dozens of cases brought by families and survivors of the military regime, which is believed to have disappeared around 200 individuals and tortured thousands more. While the scale of the violence that shook Uruguay during the Cold War seems perhaps less horrific than say, that of Peru or Guatemala (where nearly 70,000 and 200,000 individuals were killed, respectively, and countless more tortured, raped, beaten, etc.), the issue is highly divisive after 20 years of democracy in this country of just over three million. The finding is unlikely to be the last word on trials for abuses though, and human rights activists could find that the ruling only galvanizes their movement, providing the impetus to overturn the amnesty by other, constitutional means.

Rios Montt Trial to go forward - sooner than expected

On Tuesday, a judge in Guatemala's "High Impact Court" (Tribunal de Mayor Riesgo) notified the parties involved in the trial of former de facto head of state Efrain Rios Montt that the trial will begin sooner than anticipated. After reviewing complaints from representatives of Rios Montt and Jose Mauricio Rodriguez Sanchez (former intelligence director, also to stand trial for war crimes), the court dismissed claims of impartiality and, surprisingly, moved the date of the trial from mid-August to March 19 of this year.

Guatemalan courts have an historic lack of independence, frequently subject to congressional manipulation and "subordinance" to the president, according to an October presentation in Washington by Supreme Court Justice Cesar Barrientos. Guatemala's High Impact Courts, a recent development in the country's judicial system, are regarded as a vast improvement in the independence and provision of rule of law. The new courts began operating in 2009, and are dedicated to hearing cases relating to drug trafficking, organized crime, money laundering, and human rights abuse, among other things.

The proceedings of the High Impact Courts are highly transparent, according to Justice Yazmin Barrios, and the judges' identities are not hidden. As a result, judges frequently face defamation campaigns and intimidation by those who oppose their work. As the trial moves closer, it is very possible that we will see renewed attacks on the Court itself, the justices, and perhaps the victims or survivors of victims of the war as supporters of the defendants feel increasingly cornered.

The trial itself then, will be a huge test for the Guatemalan judicial system. A fair and impartial trial will go a long way (but certainly won't be enough) in strengthening the professionalism and independence of the judiciary. And, it could be a major step in rejecting a history that legitimizes the atrocities (including genocide) that occured in the early 1980s, offered by regime supporters and other potential beneficiaries of judicial impotence.

Brazil to expand anti-poverty measures

Blog do Planalto

The Brazilian government announced this week that it plans to expand the program Brazil Without Poverty (Brasil sem Miseria) to provide benefits to about 2.5 million families. The program, launched in June of last year, is a key part of president Dilma Rousseff's initiative to lift millions out of poverty and builds on popular programs begun under Lula's Zero Hunger (Fome Zero) campaign.

Currently, about half of the rural Brazilian population--about 15 percent of the total population--lives in poverty, while around 16 million (eight percent) live in extreme poverty, defined as living on less than about US$44 per day. Poverty in the country is particularly concentrated in the "semi-arid" northeast of the country, where a despite decade of impressive national growth, conditional cash transfers, and other development efforts, much of the population is extremely poor. As a result, Dilma's Brazil Without Poverty program seeks to fill in the gaps left by the popular Bolsa Familia or the Program for the Acquisition of Food, a well-functioning local agriculture development program that has helped bolster the production and sustainability of local agriculture, rather than simply alleviating the ravages of poverty and hunger.

President Rousseff's goal is to reach all 16 million living in extreme poverty.

One of the ways in which this program fills in these gaps is by actively seeking and registering families who are eligible, but have not yet participated in one of several other development schemes:

Active Search (Busca Ativa) is the strategy adopted by Brasil Sem Miseria to find and register all extremely poor families that have not been located yet. Developed in the municipal level, it is implemented by social assistance mobile teams and by the increase in the transfers of Federal Government resources to city governments. Thanks to Busca Ativa, 687 thousand families previously “invisible” were included in the Cadastro Único in its first year of existence, and are already receiving the Bolsa Família and other social benefits.

The government claims it has already lifted around 22 million people out of poverty over the past decade (while it is difficult to distinguish the particular effects of various specific projects from the effects of overall robust national economic growth throughout the period, most scholars who look at Brazil's progress agree that active anti-poverty programming deserves a significant amount of credit).

While the reach and cost of Brazil's development portfolio is impressive (this new expansion will bring targeted social spending via Bolsa Familia to about US$12 billion), its biggest downfalls so far seem to be in providing the infrastructure or follow-through for recipients who receive benefits. For example, with the Bolsa Familia program, evaluators frequently find that where recipients are required to receive medical checkups (especially pregnant women and young children) the clinics that serve the area are often inaccessible and/or under equipped. And, while benefits make it easier to send children to school more regularly, the schools serving poor rural areas in Brazil are often inadequate. Finally, the sheer number of poor Brazilians--urban and rural--make coverage a real challenge; some qualified families are simply left out.

Roll Pink Tide Roll

Flickr user: Presidencia de la República del Ecuador

The Left in Latin America is breathing a collective sigh of relief today, as two of its most important standard bearers--Venezuela's Hugo Chavez and Ecuador's Rafael Correa--signalled a continuation of progressive governance in the region.

Ecuadorian president Rafael Correa handily won reelection on Sunday, and early reporting suggests his Alianza Pais party may win a slight majority in Congress (though figures won't be official for some days). While most observers predicted a win, either in the preliminary or runoff phase, few expected the overwhelming 57 percent showing for Correa. Correa has already made history, as Ecuador's first president to win a free and fair reelection, and now as Ecuador's longest serving democratically elected president.

Sunday's result extends Correa's term through 2017, and gives the U.S.-trained economist a renewed mandate to deepen his "Citizen's Revolution." Many expect the president to double down on (much needed) infrastructure development and social spending, extending the state's role in the oil-reliant economy and supporting further integration among ALBA (Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas)countries. Correa is also unlikely to relax his harsh treatment towards opposition media.

Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez--no doubt ALBA's most important figure--alerted Venezuelans to his return from Havana early Monday with a tweet thanking God and his people. Chavez had hardly been heard from since his December 11th departure to Cuba for cancer treatment. In the meantime, rumors and speculation swirled relentlessly around the president's fitness for office(not to mention strong challenges to the legality of Chavez' status as president after missing his inauguration in January), throwing some doubt on the future of the Left in Latin America sin Chavez.

Chavez has still not disclosed the type of cancer with which he is afflicted, and despite previous assurances of his health, questions about his health ability to govern are likely to follow him for years. Former presidential challenger Enrique Capriles quickly welcomed the president back to a country facing massive economic, social, and security challenges, "Buenos días, leyendo la noticia que regresó el Presidente, bienvenido sea a Venezuela, ojalá que su retorno genere cordura en su Gob" (Good morning, reading the news about the President's return, welcome back to Venezuela, hopefully your return brings some sanity back to the government). Caracas is one of the most violent cities on earth, inflation is rampant, there is a serious housing shortage, and Venezuela's infrastructure is crumbling.

This week's developments likely mean that the Left will continue ruling in Venezuela and Ecuador at least through 2017 (Chavez' term is scheduled to end in 2019). Chavez' return should also reassure governments in Cuba, Nicaragua, and others who benefit from his government's economic largess. As I have written previously, while the tenure of both figures followed periods of political-institutional breakdown (chronic, in the case of Ecuador), neither has done much for long-term political stability in their countries. And, while their economic legacies may in fact be mixed (impressive poverty reductions, unsustainable fiscal and economic policy), their quasi-authoritarian legacies could very well undermine any gains made.

Elections in Ecuador

Ecuadorians go to the polls this Sunday to elect a president and congress. Most analysts predict a win for sitting president Rafael Correa, though if he doesn't win an outright majority (or at least 40 percent of the vote with an advantage of at least 10 percent over the runner up), he may face a runoff.

The opposition to Correa, much like the country's political system in general, is fractured (he faces seven challengers from a myriad of parties and movements). The president faces his strongest challenge on the right from Guillermo Lasso, a former banker who heads CREO (Movement Creating Opportunities). According to recent polling from ARCOP, a Mexican firm, Lasso comes in second with 26 percent to Correa's 39 percent. This result would require a runoff, tentatively scheduled for April 7.

Click here for a good breakdown of the various factions vying for power in Ecuador.

Behind Lasso is Alberto Acosta, onetime ally of Correa and co-founder of the left-leaning Alianza Pais, the party which Correa now heads. Acosta, heading a coalition of groups frustrated with Correa's authoritarianism, (particularly his continued assault on Ecuador's press) is unlikely to reach the runoff stage. However, his group could draw congressional seats away from the Alianza Pais, and frustrate the president's hopes at achieving a majority in the National Assembly, which is set to elect 137 members this week.

This week's elections will likely have far-reaching impacts on Ecuadorian economics and politics. While Correa's aggressive "anti-imperialist" rhetoric (generally aimed at international monetary institutions and the U.S.) and abuse of the media typically catch the headlines in the U.S., his development policy may be a more positive legacy. Under his tenure, poverty in Ecuador has dropped from around 37 percent to about 27 percent--still astronomical, but impressive. Ecuador's conditional cash transfer program, Bono de Desarrollo Humano, deserves some recognition here. The president is also eager to showoff new roads, schools, and medical clinics funded by heavy borrowing--mainly from China, since Ecuador has been a pariah of lending institutions since its 2008 debt default. While his economic policies may prove to be unsustainable, they have yielded real (if still tentative) results.

Correa's political-institutional legacy is likely to be more mixed, at best. Ecuador has a very poorly institutionalized electoral system, which frequently encourages volatile elections, dramatic policy swings, patronage and clientelism, short-sided economic policy, and authoritarianism, among other problems. Many of these terms apply to Correa's Ecuador, though the president cannot be held solely responsible for a poorly institutionalized system--the country went through seven presidents in ten years, prior to electing Correa. Nevertheless, Correa has built a machine centered--not unlike Venezuela's Chavistas--around a single personality. While the system may seem relatively (for Ecuador) stable at the moment, Correa's decline or departure (see for example: Chavez, Hugo) could result in any number of political upheavals, none of which are likely to contribute to Ecuador's future economic development.

Some possible scenarios for Venezuelan succession

Flickr user: Globovisión

As Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez enters his third month of convalescence in Havana, following an operation and serious lung infection in December, the struggle for power has already begun in Venezuela. Univision has a quick guide to some of the possible scenarios for succession to the presidency. Here are some of the scenarios considered:

Chavismo continues...
In this first and perhaps most likely scenario, at least in the near future, representatives from Chavez' own movement maintain control of the levers of power. In this case, the two most likely candidates to succeed the President would be Vice President Nicolas Maduro or Diosdado Cabello, president of the National Assembly. Chavez sent a strong signal by designating Maduro as his chosen successor (should he not return from Cuba) before undergoing treatment. With six years as Chavez' Foreign Minister under his belt, Maduro, a former bus driver, also apparently has something of a rapport with the Castro brothers in Cuba. His foreign experience is particularly important to Chavismo, a movement that under Chavez, has had strong regional and global ambitions.

Cabello, on the other hand, has more of a constitutional basis for assuming the presidency. Moreover, the president of the National Assembly also wields important influence in military sectors and within the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV). Many note however, that Cabello lacks foreign credentials and doesn't possess anywhere near the kind of charisma necessary to head a movement so closely linked to a single persona.

Internal power struggle...
If either of the two leaders most closely associated with Chavismo fail to fill the power vacuum created by a possible Chavez departure, there could be a wider struggle for power between leaders on the periphery of Chavismo, weilding their own powerful constituencies. In such a situation, analysts predict that Francisco Arias Cardenas, governor of the large oil-producing state of Zulia; Jose Vielma More, governor of Tachira; or Rosa Virginia Chavez, the President's daughter, would vie for power. Arias Cardenas, one of the original members of Chavez' 1992 coup attempt, would be a powerful player if the PSUV were to hold primaries to select a successor candidate--though Arias fell out of favor with Chavez and his closest advisers in recent years.

Jose Vielma Mora, another member of the 1992 coup cohort and current governor, is another possible candidate. His credentials come from the fact that he is apparently one of the Chavez administration's most efficient functionaries. His handicap is the low profile he has kept since the 1992 coup attempt.

Rosa Virginia has an important claim to the mantle of Chavismo as the President's oldest daughter, de facto first lady, and a close advisor. While she has little experience with governing, analysts predict that she could play more of a "kingmaker" role in a potential transition.

Outsider opposition...
The Venezuelan opposition sees a possible path to power in the case of Chavez' death. This could come about through an agreement among and between factions of Chavez' movement, or through a strong showing in elections, which should be called in the case of the President's permanent absence. The opposition has been notoriously divided in the past decade, and any rise to national power would likely rest on the shoulders of the governor of the state of Miranda, Henrique Capriles. Capriles recently came the closest to dethroning Chavez, losing the October 2012 election with 45 percent of the vote. In the absence of Chavez' strong unifying effect for those opposed to his policies, it is unclear whether Capriles could hold together various opposing factions and put together a strong coalition.

"An African Solution to an African Problem"

Last week, Senegal began setting up a court to try former Chadian dictator Hissein Habre for crimes against humanity. Habre led Chad between mid-1982 and 1990, coming to power and being forced out via coups. Under his command, the armed forces of Chad repelled attacks from Muammar Gaddafi's Libya in the north of the country, and fought a simmering civil war throughout the 1980s marked by torture, disappearances, and executions of regime opponents.

An estimated 40,000 people were killed and 200,000 tortured under Habre's rule.

Following a coup in 1990, Habre fled for Senegal, where he has remained under some degree of protection since. Belgium sought to have Habre extradited to stand trial in the Hague in 2005. Senegalese president Wade, who like many heads of state, worry about the precedent of trying leaders for war crimes, resisted calls to hand over Habre.

After the defeat of Abdoulaye Wade in 2012 however, Senegalese President Macky Sall negotiated the creation of an African Union-mandated court, paving the way for trial of the former dictator.

Writing on Aljazeera, Chandra Lekha Sriram observes that, assuming Habre does eventually stand trial, "What we might be seeing is a shift from the narrative of Habré as an African Pinochet, and international justice and the ICC as neocolonial, to the fruition of one possible model for "African solutions to African problems".

A possible "African solution" is hugely significant for several reasons. First, as Sriram again points out, this case would represent the first time a country's national court tries another country's former head of state for crimes against humanity. This model would provide an alternative path to bring political leaders to justice in addition to domestic courts, ad hoc international tribunals, or the oft-maligned International Criminal Court.

Second, and perhaps more significantly, the Senegalese model may set an important precedent for trying for former heads of state, and may build on a growing collection of jurisprudence and rulings breaking down the once insurmountable barriers to accountability for war crimes committed at the highest political levels.

Katherine Sikkink's 2011 book Justice Cascade (W.W. Norton & Co.) gives an excellent accounting of the barriers overcome in recent decades. The first countries to try former members of an oppressive military regime were Greece and Portugal, in the mid-1970s. These trials, while significant in that they were able to charge former leaders, were not human rights trials. They were trials for treason and overthrowing the state. Nevertheless, these trials “broke the back” of regime hardliners and supporters, and thus opened the door to the possibility of punishment for other abuses. 

The next experiment with trials of members of a former regime came in mid-1980s Argentina, when that country tried nine members of the former military regime. In the case of Argentina, however, prosecutors did in fact try—and convict—members of the military junta for human rights abuses committed between 1976 and 1983. As prosecutors continued to target low-level military officers (rather than just political-military leaders), this provoked a backlash in segments of Argentine society and regime supporters launched a coup attempt in 1987. This instance is hailed by some as proof that human rights trials destabilize new democracies.

Sikkink argues, however, that despite the backlash, coup attempt, and the amnesty laws and pardons that followed, the symbolic societal rejection of immunity for human rights abuses and the new relationship between the Argentine state and military were firmly in place. Furthermore, the initial successes in Argentina had already changed people’s beliefs and expectations about justice in transitional contexts throughout the globe. In the mid-1970s, when Greece and Portugal were experimenting with transitional justice, the idea of prosecuting heads of state for human rights abuses was unthinkable. After the Argentine trials, it was not.

Further, the Argentine trials informed a series of international treaties and conventions including the Convention Against Torture, The Genocide Convention, and the International Criminal Court--all of which embody and codify what was once a novel approach to international law: individual responsibility.

This idea of individuals—rather than states—being tried for crimes against humanity, combined with the ability of individuals to file complaints of human rights violations (in Argentina) is now a cornerstone of international human rights law.

Heads of state and senior political leaders have now been tried in a variety of fora: domestic courts (Pinochet, Fujimori, and now Efrain Rios Montt), international tribunals (the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda),  and the International Criminal Court, which handed down its conviction of Thomas Lubanga last year.

The Senegalese model is a positive step forward for accountability, especially in Africa. While any number of factors could prevent the trial--not expected to start until 2015--from yielding a ruling (death of the 70 year old defendant, political meddling, mishandling of evidence, etc.), the precedent and possibility of prosecution for current and future African (and non-African!) leaders are in themselves a positive development.

Plague strikes coffee crops in Central America

Coffee growers in Central America and southern Mexico are experiencing a widespread plague of "rust" produced by the fungus Hemileia vastatrix. In Costa Rica, authorities expect 10,000 growers to be affected in a period estimated to last two to three years. In Guatemala, where a majority of growers are small operations, the situation is much worse. Of the 270,000 hectares planted with coffee, approximately 193,000 hectares (around 70 percent) are affected by the fungus. The situation is expected to last three to five years and affect over 100,000 people.

Nils Leporowski, President of the National Coffee Association of Guatemala (ANACAFE), noted that, though the rust has affected crops throughout the region previously, climate change has created a favorable environment for the offending fungus. "In the last three years the climatic conditions have favored the propagation of the fungus, due to a combination of higher temperatures and rains."

Guatemala's Agriculture Minister Elmer Lopez says the 2012-13 coffee harvest (10/12-9/13) is expected to shrink 15 percent on the year, while the next year's harvest could lose as much as 40 percent.

Growers in the region will not benefit from an increase in prices that might be expected to accompany such declines in production, however. Coffee prices have only "limited potential" for decline this year, according to the International Coffee Organization. While Central American crops have been hit hard, Brazil and Colombia (which is recovering from its own coffee pest outbreak) are reporting bumper crops

Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica have all declared states of emergency to allow government dollars to flow to affected areas. Guatemalan president Otto Perez Molina ordered about $10 million in federal funds be made available to fight the blight.

Brazil to monitor Bolivian skies with drones

Brazil and Bolivia are in the final stages of reaching a deal to allow Brazil to operate unmanned aerial drones over the border with Bolivia. According to BBC Mundo, the deal--the details of which will be released only upon final approval--is expected to see Brazil play an increasingly lead role in counter narcotics operations throughout the Southern Cone.

The use of drones in Brazil, soon over neighboring countries' airspace, is increasing in the context of decreased U.S. presence in the region and an increased drug trade through the Southern Cone. In 2008, the Bolivian government kicked out the American DEA following accusations of "political meddling." Over the same time period, research is beginning to show an increasing flow of drugs through Brazilian, Argentine, and Uruguayan ports. Cocaine consumption in the U.S. has declined nearly 40 percent in the last decade, according to government figures, while consumption in Europe has risen. The European market is now nearly the size of the U.S. market, and Europeans generally pay more per kilo for cocaine.

Increased operations along the U.S.-Mexican border and cooperation with Central American interdiction efforts has put pressure on traffickers seeking to bring their product to market--as a result, the European market, and shipping routes from the southern cone (via west Africa) have become increasingly attractive. The notorious "tri-border" area between Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina, has become somewhat of a hot spot for drug movers, organized crime, and according to some reporting, Hezbollah.

The 14 Heron model drones, purchased from the Israeli firm Israel Aerospace Industries for a total of around $350 million, are capable of flying for 37 hours straight, and can cover over 1000 kilometers.

Bolivian Ambassador to Brazil Jerjes Justiniano said "Bolivia has a very positive view" towards anti-drug cooperation with Brazil. It wasn't clear whether the Brazilians anticipated participating with Bolivia on the ground, when it comes to destroying illicit plantations or laboratories.

Sunshine and Shadows: New light shed on Obama administration's drone war casts darker shadows on clandestine operations

The Obama administration's execution of shadowy drone operations in Yemen, Somalia, Pakistan, and elsewhere, widely covered in the media but officially unacknowledged, may be his most lasting foreign policy legacy, and the most descriptive element of an "Obama Doctrine." The drone operations, inherited from Obama's predecessor and then expanded, came under serious scrutiny after the administration killed U.S. citizen and Al-Qaeda capo Anwar al-Awlaki in late 2011.

This week, the administration's legal justification for its policy of killing American citizens engaged in armed conflict with the U.S. surfaced in the form of a leaked 2011 Justice Department white paper. Writing for Foreign Policy, Rosa Brooks has a great breakdown of the core legal arguments, and the incredible discretion afforded to the administration in targeting and eliminating enemies.

The document is not a strategy paper; rather, it is a justification of the lawfulness of an array of actions the administration may take, or may have taken against U.S. citizens engaged in armed conflict against the U.S. It is a preemptive defense of a policy it knows will likely run into serious legal challenges somewhere down the line.

"The paper does not attempt to determine the minimum requirements necessary to render such an operation lawful; nor does it assess what might be required to render a lethal operation against a U.S. citizen lawful in other circumstances, including an operation against enemy forces on a traditional battlefield or an operation against a U.S. citizen who is not a senior operational leader of such forces. Here the Department of Justice concludes only that where the following three conditions are met, a U.S. operation using lethal force in a foreign country against a U.S. citizen who is a senior operational leader of al-Qu'ida or an associated force would be lawful..."

It is notable for its seemingly innocuous yet vague language. The three conditions are as follows: "an informed, high-level official of the U.S. government has determined that the targeted individual poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States; capture is infeasible, and the United States continues to monitor whether capture becomes feasible; and the operation would be conducted in a manner consistent with applicable law of war principles."

Words and phrases like "informed, high-level official," "imminent," and "applicable law of war principles" are what worry critics of the administration's justification. As Brooks points out, the document does a poor job of defining each term, thus leaving itself legal ground to which it can retroactively appeal in the face of some future legal challenge.

The administration said it will release additional classified memos expounding on the legal justification for targetting of U.S. citizens today. This comes on the heels of intense pressure from Congress and the day Senate confirmation hearings are set to begin for John Brennan's appointment to head the CIA.

Colombian Peace Negotiations

In November 2012, the Colombian Government sat down with representatives from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and began what has become a sincere, if tentative, process of negotiating an end to the longest running civil conflict in the hemisphere. Now into its third month, there are some signs of progress and some signs of imminent and increasing strain.

The talks, hosted by Cuba, revolve around five main points of contention: land distribution and development, demobilization, political participation for (future) ex-guerrillas, drug policy, and victims' rights. For now, negotiators are focused on the issue of land distribution policy, at once the root of the conflict and perhaps the closest thing to low hanging-fruit in these negotiations. Recent initiatives by the Colombian government have given a little ground in this area. Last year, the government launched a land restitution scheme aimed at putting land (around 2.5 million hectares in 2012) back into the hands of people who have fled the conflict.

In a country where approximately 1.15 percent of individuals control just over half of the country's farmland (according to the UNDP), there is clearly a long way to go. And, the going will likely get tougher; the government would like to distribute only fallow federal lands, while the FARC focuses on land concentrated in the hands of the conservative agro-export elite.

Writing for the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), Adam Isaacson notes that so far, both sides have come to the table in sincerity and have shown collegiality and respect for secrecy. There have been almost no leaks and despite the end of a unilateral FARC ceasefire on January 20 and resumption of hostilities, the parties have remained at the table. Interestingly, the government's refusal to declare or participate in any ceasefire (unlike during previous talks), may serve to strengthen the possibility of achieving a deal--particularly considering the fact that the FARC is considered to be the weakest it has been in decades.

Several potential obstacles could, however, derail the process. As negotiators continue to dig in to the land reform issue, the question of what land to redistribute and to whom will be tricky. WOLA's Isaacson observes that the country's largest association of cattle-ranchers has joined former president Alvaro Uribe in strenuously denouncing the negotiations. The two parties have not begun to address the question of political integration of ex-guerrillas, or the issue of drug policy reform--two issues that could raise the ire of many Colombian groups as well as the international community (the U.S. included).

The Santos administration has expressed its unwillingness to continue negotiations past November, 2013. As a result, the pace of the negotiations has become a real challenge. Further, assuming a deal is reached (far from a safe bet), implementation of the plan is an unknown. The government would like to put the resolution to a referendum while the FARC would prefer to institutionalize the outcome through a constitutional convention. Finally, the country's other long-standing rebel group, the National Liberation Army (ELN) has not been included in the negotiations. It is unclear whether the ELN could be folded into some kind of agreement, or if the two groups would have to start from scratch. The specter of disaffected farqueros defecting to the ELN or forming a splinter organization raises the important question of how consolidated the FARC really is: if a deal were reached, could they deliver?

Many Colombians as well as international observers (myself included) are cautiously optimistic. A large majority--71 percent--in a December 2012 Gallup poll indicated they supported the peace negotiations. When asked about their expectations for a deal though, they were somewhat ambivalent: only 43 percent expressed optimism.

Growing Pains(?)

Coming off the nightclub fire in the Brazilian city of Santa Maria on January 27th, Brazilians are facing a kind of collective reckoning reminiscent of what Americans went through after tragedies such as Newtown, Deep Water Horizon, or the 2010 Upper Big Branch mine disaster in West Virginia. The fire, a result of an indoor pyrotechnic display at a nightclub packed way over capacity, resulted in the deaths of now 237, with at least another hundred injured--likely permanently--from toxic smoke inhalation and burns.

This episode helps illustrate the gap between expectation and reality in a society that has come into its own in recent decades. Brazil, the "B" in the BRICS countries--a club of booming economies and rapidly developing societies--has experienced strong economic development, improved education and health indicators, and political transformation. The country's middle class has been growing impressively, and its political leaders have taken an increasingly important role in international diplomacy. The country looks forward to marking its arrival on the world stage with a flourish by hosting both the World Cup of soccer and the Summer Olympics in 2014 and 2016, respectively. In fact, Brazilians were preparing to celebrate 500 hundred days until World Cup kickoff, and their famous Carnival celebrations were to begin next week.

Instead, 22 municipalities have canceled Carnival, and the World Cup countdown celebration was put off.

A country becoming accustomed to "First World-ism" (excuse the expression) then, is rightly shocked and horrified by the needless and preventable deaths of so many. As the dust has settled, it appears that the club should not have been open at all. According to an article in this week's The Economist, the club's public health license and fire safety plan had expired. Whether the club was allowed to continue operating because of a bureaucratic mix up, or perhaps corruption, is unknown. What is clear though, is that despite the fact that Brazilians, especially poor favela-dwellers, experience small scale disasters frequently (landslides, crime sprees, bus crashes, etc.) the scale of this one seems to have changed the conversation around public safety.

This is a "never again" moment for Brazilians.

Brazilian states have a patchwork system of public safety regulations, and local municipalities are responsible for enforcement. Federal standards--introduced in 2007, but not passed--are now more likely to pass the congress. Whether this translates into improved capacity and follow through on oversight is another question.

The Economist notes that Brazilians can be proud of the response by firefighters, armed forces, and hospitals the night of the blaze (notwithstanding reports that security guards initially blocked the club exit thinking that people were trying to dodge paying their tabs). This will be of little consolation to those affected. Hopefully the heartbreak and outrage will be enough to break the inertia surrounding public safety and enforcement, and action will extend not just to college towns like Santa Maria, but to the deepest reaches of urban favelas and rural communities alike.