Good readings on Chavez, Chavismo, and the future of Venezuela

Like many Latin America enthusiasts, I've found Venezuela's Hugo Chavez to be one of the most interesting and important figures in the politics of the Western Hemisphere in generations, for better or worse. His death this week may (or may not) be the end of an era, but his legacy will likely continue to have huge impacts on politics, economics, and society in Venezuela--if not throughout the region--for years to come.

Rather than pontificating on the virtues and vices of his tenure at Venezuela's helm, I thought I'd leave it up to some more qualified writers. Here you go...

Juan Forero has a good primer of the questions swirling around Chavez' absence on the Washington Post.

The New York Times has a piece focusing on el Comandante's chosen successor, Nicolas Maduro and his potential relationship with the U.S. He notes that while Maduro has already started to adopt some of Chavez' personal quirks, including his strident anti-Americanism, others think he may prove to be a more pragmatic leader.

The Washington Office on Latin America's David Smilde has a good Q&A on the Venezuelan Politics and Human Rights blog, as well as a thoughtful take on the (hopefully) permanent inclusion of Venezuela's most marginalized in the country's political system--despite continued struggles.

This editorial on The Guardian has a brief look at the challenges Chavez' own oil-fueled largess may leave for his own country--especially the poor urban masses who so benefited from it.

The BBC provides a profile of Chavez, from his training as an army paratrooper, to the 1992 coup, to the presidency. The Guardian has another, here.

Writing on The Atlantic, Francisco Toro takes a serious look at the dark side of Chavez harassment and bullying of dissident voices, especially within his own movement. He's right that while many in the U.S. may have gotten a kick out of Chavez calling President Bush the devil, or blaming the absence of life on Mars, or the earthquake in Haiti on American-style capitalism or secret "tectonic" weaponry, respectively, this stuff wasn't so amusing to many Venezuelans. He writes, "This image of El Comandante as a mere eccentric drove those of us who witnessed the progressive disintegration of Venezuela's democratic institutions around the bend. A rogue looks a lot less lovable when laughing at him can cost you your job, your property, your livelihood, your freedom."

The Miami Herald's Andres Oppenheimer compares Chavez' legacy to that of Argentina's Peron. I agree that Chavez is likely to be little more than a cultural icon beyond Venezuela from here on out, and that Chavez has not been the only one who's helped the poor (Peru and Chile--hardly bastions of leftist government in the last decade--did even more to alleviate poverty than Chavez). But, his memory will certainly prove useful to all sorts of electoral groups vying for power--whether on the left or right. I think this has already begun to happen; Chavez' opponent in October's election, Henrique Capriles, seemed forced to accept the continued existence of many of Chavez' most popular social programs. This could last for decades.

Al Jazeera English has a handful of op-eds looking at various aspects of Chavez' legacy. Janvieve Williams Comrie looks at the impacts of Chavez on race relations and the improved position of many ethnic and racial minorities, both in Venezuela and throughout the region. This is one of the least talked about aspects of Chavismo, especially in the U.S. media, but may be one of Chavez' most important and long-lasting impacts.

Mark Weisbrot, of the Center for Economic and Policy Research, has a favorable view of Chavez' legacy on poverty in the country and for Latin American independence from the U.S. Manuela Picq and Belen Fernandez also write (mostly sympathetically) on the ability of Chavez to incorporate Venezuela's long marginalized lower classes into the country's politics and economy. Particularly interesting are Picq's thoughts the rise of the Left in Latin America during the past 14 years or so. I think Chavez' role in this respect is often exaggerated (I give more credit to moderate leftists in some Mexican states, and to Brazil's "Lula"), but not unimportant.

Also writing on Al Jazeera, Mike Allison, a Central America expert, has some insights into how Chavez' death might impact politics in the region and how Chavez the figure might compare to other Latin American figures such as Allende, Arbenz, or Peron. I'd also recommend reading Allison's blog; he's prolific and really insightful.

The Christian Science Monitor's blog, the Latin American Monitor, has a handful of posts on the subject of Chavez and his succession, one of which focuses specifically on the character of Nicolas Maduro, who has already begun to "channel his inner Chavez."

Another good blog, Bloggings by Boz, looks at the possibility of Venezuela (indeed, Latin America) moving beyond the timeless figure of the caudillo. This is especially good reading for gringos (myself included), who may be more prone to look at Latin American politics and leadership through jaded eyes, wondering who (read: which new caudillo) will replace Chavez.

If anyone has any good suggested reading on the future of the Venezuelan party system, I'd love to see it; I think this is one of the more uncertain and unexplored issues, beyond the simple question of who will govern in Venezuela. Chavez came to power following the collapse of one of Latin America's most durable two-party systems in the 1980s and 90s. His career has obviously destroyed any remnants of this punto fijo system--so, where to now?

Roll Pink Tide Roll

Flickr user: Presidencia de la República del Ecuador

The Left in Latin America is breathing a collective sigh of relief today, as two of its most important standard bearers--Venezuela's Hugo Chavez and Ecuador's Rafael Correa--signalled a continuation of progressive governance in the region.

Ecuadorian president Rafael Correa handily won reelection on Sunday, and early reporting suggests his Alianza Pais party may win a slight majority in Congress (though figures won't be official for some days). While most observers predicted a win, either in the preliminary or runoff phase, few expected the overwhelming 57 percent showing for Correa. Correa has already made history, as Ecuador's first president to win a free and fair reelection, and now as Ecuador's longest serving democratically elected president.

Sunday's result extends Correa's term through 2017, and gives the U.S.-trained economist a renewed mandate to deepen his "Citizen's Revolution." Many expect the president to double down on (much needed) infrastructure development and social spending, extending the state's role in the oil-reliant economy and supporting further integration among ALBA (Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas)countries. Correa is also unlikely to relax his harsh treatment towards opposition media.

Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez--no doubt ALBA's most important figure--alerted Venezuelans to his return from Havana early Monday with a tweet thanking God and his people. Chavez had hardly been heard from since his December 11th departure to Cuba for cancer treatment. In the meantime, rumors and speculation swirled relentlessly around the president's fitness for office(not to mention strong challenges to the legality of Chavez' status as president after missing his inauguration in January), throwing some doubt on the future of the Left in Latin America sin Chavez.

Chavez has still not disclosed the type of cancer with which he is afflicted, and despite previous assurances of his health, questions about his health ability to govern are likely to follow him for years. Former presidential challenger Enrique Capriles quickly welcomed the president back to a country facing massive economic, social, and security challenges, "Buenos días, leyendo la noticia que regresó el Presidente, bienvenido sea a Venezuela, ojalá que su retorno genere cordura en su Gob" (Good morning, reading the news about the President's return, welcome back to Venezuela, hopefully your return brings some sanity back to the government). Caracas is one of the most violent cities on earth, inflation is rampant, there is a serious housing shortage, and Venezuela's infrastructure is crumbling.

This week's developments likely mean that the Left will continue ruling in Venezuela and Ecuador at least through 2017 (Chavez' term is scheduled to end in 2019). Chavez' return should also reassure governments in Cuba, Nicaragua, and others who benefit from his government's economic largess. As I have written previously, while the tenure of both figures followed periods of political-institutional breakdown (chronic, in the case of Ecuador), neither has done much for long-term political stability in their countries. And, while their economic legacies may in fact be mixed (impressive poverty reductions, unsustainable fiscal and economic policy), their quasi-authoritarian legacies could very well undermine any gains made.

Some possible scenarios for Venezuelan succession

Flickr user: Globovisión

As Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez enters his third month of convalescence in Havana, following an operation and serious lung infection in December, the struggle for power has already begun in Venezuela. Univision has a quick guide to some of the possible scenarios for succession to the presidency. Here are some of the scenarios considered:

Chavismo continues...
In this first and perhaps most likely scenario, at least in the near future, representatives from Chavez' own movement maintain control of the levers of power. In this case, the two most likely candidates to succeed the President would be Vice President Nicolas Maduro or Diosdado Cabello, president of the National Assembly. Chavez sent a strong signal by designating Maduro as his chosen successor (should he not return from Cuba) before undergoing treatment. With six years as Chavez' Foreign Minister under his belt, Maduro, a former bus driver, also apparently has something of a rapport with the Castro brothers in Cuba. His foreign experience is particularly important to Chavismo, a movement that under Chavez, has had strong regional and global ambitions.

Cabello, on the other hand, has more of a constitutional basis for assuming the presidency. Moreover, the president of the National Assembly also wields important influence in military sectors and within the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV). Many note however, that Cabello lacks foreign credentials and doesn't possess anywhere near the kind of charisma necessary to head a movement so closely linked to a single persona.

Internal power struggle...
If either of the two leaders most closely associated with Chavismo fail to fill the power vacuum created by a possible Chavez departure, there could be a wider struggle for power between leaders on the periphery of Chavismo, weilding their own powerful constituencies. In such a situation, analysts predict that Francisco Arias Cardenas, governor of the large oil-producing state of Zulia; Jose Vielma More, governor of Tachira; or Rosa Virginia Chavez, the President's daughter, would vie for power. Arias Cardenas, one of the original members of Chavez' 1992 coup attempt, would be a powerful player if the PSUV were to hold primaries to select a successor candidate--though Arias fell out of favor with Chavez and his closest advisers in recent years.

Jose Vielma Mora, another member of the 1992 coup cohort and current governor, is another possible candidate. His credentials come from the fact that he is apparently one of the Chavez administration's most efficient functionaries. His handicap is the low profile he has kept since the 1992 coup attempt.

Rosa Virginia has an important claim to the mantle of Chavismo as the President's oldest daughter, de facto first lady, and a close advisor. While she has little experience with governing, analysts predict that she could play more of a "kingmaker" role in a potential transition.

Outsider opposition...
The Venezuelan opposition sees a possible path to power in the case of Chavez' death. This could come about through an agreement among and between factions of Chavez' movement, or through a strong showing in elections, which should be called in the case of the President's permanent absence. The opposition has been notoriously divided in the past decade, and any rise to national power would likely rest on the shoulders of the governor of the state of Miranda, Henrique Capriles. Capriles recently came the closest to dethroning Chavez, losing the October 2012 election with 45 percent of the vote. In the absence of Chavez' strong unifying effect for those opposed to his policies, it is unclear whether Capriles could hold together various opposing factions and put together a strong coalition.

Whither Chavismo?

With Hugo Chavez' hospitalization in December for continued cancer treatment, El Comandante's legacy on Venezuela and Latin America, more broadly, has been cause for a lot of speculation (and some hyperventilation).

Julia Sweig at the Council on Foreign Relations has an interesting piece this week that provides a good look at "Chavismo" and its possible legacy should Chavez loss his battle with cancer in Havana. While it provides a good primer on the issue, I think it neglects to some degree the important historical and structural origins or Chavismo--some of which have changed, some persist--that might help gauge the direction of Chavez' movement.

The article leads with a picture of (presumably) a Chavez supporter's banner showing the president side-by-side with an image of Jesus. This pairing or association in the minds or hearts of Chavez supporters is no accident, in fact, it is part of a carefully crafted (dare I say, cult-like) amalgamation of the state, Christ, Chavez, and South American liberation hero Simon Bolivar. But there is more to Chavismo than a cult of personality and more to Venezuelan politics than Chavismo.

A big part of the highly anti-neoliberal, anti-party nature of Chavez' movement is a product of institutional and economic breakdown during the 1980s. Since 1958, two more or less centrist, American-allied political parties ruled Venezuela alternatively: Acción Democratica (AD) and the Christian Social Party (COPEI). Under this system, known as the punto fijo regime, the two parties used substantial oil revenues to drive import-substituted industrialization while activists on the far right and the far left were generally excluded from political participation.

This arrangement was effective (a relative term) through much of the 1970s when oil revenues were high and the party in power could spend lavishly. As with many resource booms though, when oil prices declined in the 1980s not only did revenues crash, but a corrupt and inefficient bureaucracy remained. Failure to address the problems of increasing poverty, deteriorating infrastructure, and skyrocketing foreign debt reached a climax in 1989. Newly reelected president Carlos Andres Pérez responded to the dire economic situation by enacting severe austerity measures as part of his gran viraje (great turnaround). On February 27, in response to these measures and a spike in gas prices in Caracas and around the country, mass protests shattered the political calm that had defined the country for decades. These mass disturbances, known as the Caracazo, resulted in nearly 300 (unofficial counts approached 2000) deaths and laid the groundwork for the decline of punto fijo, despite failing to reverse the measures or turn the administration out of power.

The decade that followed was characterized by continued economic decline, despite deep liberalizing economic reforms. Venezuelans experienced soaring inflation—up to 80 percent in 1989—increased unemployment and a decline of up to 40 percent GDP since the early 1980s, as the state privatized many of its heavy industry and communications assets. The percentage of the population living in poverty rose from approximately 17 percent in 1980 to over 48 percent in 1997. As the economy declined, racial and class cleavages also were exacerbated.

It is hard to overestimate the deep and lasting effect of such decay on a population; these effects, and the resulting backlash were compounded by the structural readjustment programs that the country adopted in the years that followed.

Such were the conditions in the country when Chávez, then a young army officer, led a failed coup against the Pérez administration in February 1992. While the coup failed and Chávez was imprisoned, the young officer was granted a chance to speak to his fellow rebels and to the country. In his speech, Chávez took responsibility for the coup and called on his sympathizers to stand down while at the same time demanding reform. In doing so, Chávez endeared himself to disillusioned Venezuelans and began building a personal political constituency. Moisés Naím, a Venezuelan economist writes, “His televised image conveyed the possibility of change, a break from the political and economic schemes usually blamed for the country’s problems. A new face unrelated to the traditional power structures and offering to guide the nation back to prosperity, equality, and integrity…”

The young army officer’s discourse was particularly effective in the barrios of Caracas and other major cities. These masses of impoverished, disenfranchised barrio-dwellers—the pueblo-pobreza—now make up the backbone of the chavista movement’s goal of implementing a “participatory democracy.” The son of school teachers and a man with some indigenous heritage, Chávez’ credentials with such groups were impeccable.

Chavismo, which has been described as populist, nationalist, and at times militarist, overlaps a with a kind of parallel phenomenon known as Bolivarianismo--an idealized interpretation of “the Liberator” Simón Bolívar’s principles. What it adds to the Chavez portfolio is an ostensibly socialist and a strong pan-Latin American sentiment.

The character of Bolívar in Chávez’ agenda has a largely symbolic but crucially legitimizing function. Chavez has come to invoke the collective memory of Bolívar regularly. In doing so, the president cites Bolívar’s supposedly socialist tendencies. “Every day, in fact, I become more convinced that the evolution of Bolívar’s thought pointed toward socialism. If he had lived a few decades longer, I am absolutely sure he would have become a socialist…”

Chavismo's party structure, "direct" democracy, and constitutional/electoral reforms will have an important impact on Venezuelan politics after Chavez; more on that in a later post.