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| Courtesy Freedom House |
As the crisis in Syria simmers-- or boils--into its second year I am continually noticing how this conflict is seemingly redefining, or at least compelling a rethink of various aspects of US foreign policy and international relations in general.
Interestingly, I am seeing a lot less chatter about the so-called "twitter revolutions," and less breathless praise for the role of Western social media in the Arab Spring/Uprisings in general. Syria re-grounds us in the truth that revolution comes about because individuals make serious calculations and take grave, prolonged risks. In a way, this was inevitable. When the barriers to collective action were low, and speed was key, as in Tunisia, social media may play an important facilitating role in the overthrow of an autocratic government. As Arab dictators "learned" from the mistakes of their neighbors though (the "demonstration effect" doesn't just apply to activists and social movements, after all), they cracked down on demonstrations, first in Libya and then in Syria, hard. Suddenly, it wasn't enough that vast numbers of disenfranchised citizens, and youth especially, were able to mobilize in large numbers: as Qaddafi and Assad mobilized their own forces against demonstrators, peaceful protests alone quickly became insufficient. The springy revolts of Tunisia and Egypt, even Yemen, gave way to conflicts that--particularly in Syria--bear more resemblance to the drawn out proxy wars of the Cold War era.
As these conflicts settle, it will be interesting to see how the "depth" of revolt needed to oust former autocrats affects the depth of reform in each country. In other words, since Syria's revolt against the Assad regime (and its particular system of political, economic, and ethnic patronage) seems to be all-consuming, can we predict that whatever change follows his eventual (but not inevitable) fall will be comprehensive? On the other hand, since the Tunisian uprising was comparatively brief and bloodless, will reforms there more superficial? Too soon to tell, but there's a good research paper in there somewhere...
Another development I have found interesting concerns the threshold for US intervention in Syria. President Obama apparently rebuffed a handful of his senior foreign policy advisers who had advocated greater US support for Syrian rebels last fall. Since then, the administration and most of Congress seems to have settled on setting a "red line" barring the use of chemical weapons against regime opponents. Until this line is crossed, the argument goes, the US is unlikely to get more involved than it has been up to this point.
Yet in late March, it seemed that chemical weapons had been used in Syria (though both sides of the conflict blame each other) and, according to Congressman Mike Rogers, the administration's red line had been crossed. There are several dangers of setting red lines in foreign policy. First, setting a red line can alleviate the pressure on presidents to "do something," while stopping short of intervention. In this way, they can serve the same function as economic sanctions on a country, in that they are a kind of release valve for domestic pressure (admittedly, there isn't much in the case of Syria) on the administration to get involved in the crisis. Red lines send a dangerous signal to targeted regimes though: "up to this point and no further." In other words, the US has signaled that it has no intention, unilaterally or otherwise, of halting Assad's assault on Syrians unless he makes the mistake of using chemical weapons. He likely interprets this as a clear signal that he may use whatever devastating force, including Scud missiles against Syrians, as long as they are not chemical weapons, without fear of reprisal from the US, and likely the West.
The second problem with our affinity for red lines is related to the first: while sending a dangerous signal to a regime like Assad's, what happens if this red line is crossed? In other words, if we find that chemical weapons are deployed in Syria, is the US really prepared to stand by its word? One response might be that red lines, whether concerning Syria or Iran, for that matter, usually set a pretty high bar, and the language detailing any breach of said red lines tends to be vague. As a result, presidents are happy to use the red line option if a) they don't believe the offending regime will actually cross it, and b) if they can be sufficiently vague in their promised response to a potential breach so as not to actually commit themselves to action they wouldn't otherwise be interested in taking.
This raises some uncomfortable questions for US policy in the Levant. Why has the Obama administration drawn a line against chemical weapons, but not equally destructive (though maybe less gruesome?) conventional weapons? Is it possible that the administration's policy has in fact signaled to Assad that he is free to use devastating force on his own country without fear of reprisal--and, by extension, has the administration's policy actually contributed to an increased level of destruction on behalf of the Assad regime? On the other side of the coin, what does this policy signal to Syrian rebels? Knowing that the cavalry is not on its way, is it possible that the administration's policy drove elements of the rebellion into the arms of Al Qaeda (forgive the hypothetical oversimplification)? While I am usually not one to exaggerate US influence in the international affairs (actors in Syria and the region certainly have their own agency and motives for acting, independent of what the US thinks or does), the implications of US inaction here are unsettling.
As reports portray a the worsening devastation and terror that afflicts Syrians, it has become clear to many that Syria may have already passed the point of no return. Writing at The Atlantic, David Rohde has a cutting critique of Obama's Syria policy, laying the blame for the Syrian opposition's factionalization at the feet of the US president. The Guardian's Ed Vulliamy writes of a "nauseous sense of deja vu," as he recalls the World's paralysis in the days of Bosnia and Rwanda. Recognizing the end of what was once a relatively prosperous Syrian economy and the threats posed to the entire Middle East, The Economist recently called the world to action. Freedom House, too, makes a strong case for greater US involvement, citing the possible disintegration of the Syrian state and an escalation and spread of sectarian violence throughout the region.
