US Immigration Reform Battle Begins

Flickr user: xomiele

Last week the bi-partisan group of Senators known as the "gang of eight" released their draft plan to reform America's immigration system. The bill, called the "Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act" (SB744), is ambitious (but not overly so) and may stand the best chance of passage of any bill in a generation.

The legislation is built around three broad pillars: border security, work authorization, and a path to citizenship. At first glance, it is clear that this bill is heavily oriented towards soothing the concerns of those who claim the bill amounts to an "amnesty" for undocumented workers; it's no coincidence that "border security" comes first in the title. The concern of course, is that with any pathway to citizenship for some 11 million undocumented aliens living in the country at the moment (add to that somewhere between a few hundred thousand and several million family members that could follow in the years after they gain citizenship) would encourage increased illegal migration from the southern border in the years to come--a common criticism of the Regan era immigration reform bill. In this sense, the bill is in fact a form of amnesty--the whole point is to start bringing these people "out of the shadows"--but does its best to mitigate against the impending flood of migrants that many conservatives fear.

To counter this, the bill includes several "triggers" related to stepped up border security. In it's current form, within five years of passage, the administration will need to certify that they have achieved a 90 percent effectiveness rate at "all high risk sectors," which presumably refers to parts of the southern border but may include other ports of entry.

"Our bill will appropriate $3 billion to implement this strategy. This money will be used for acquiring, among other things: 

o Surveillance and detection capabilities developed or used by the Department of Defense;
o Additional Border Patrol agents and Customs and Border Protection officers at and
between ports of entry along the Southern border;
o Fixed, mobile, and agent portable surveillance systems; and
o Unmanned aerial systems and fixed-wing aircraft and necessary and qualified staff
and equipment to fully utilize such systems...."

It will also provide funding for 3,500 additional Customs agents nationwide, Border Protection, and State, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies, and will:

"Provide Authorization for the National Guard to be deployed to the Southwest border for the following purposes:
(1) to construct fencing, including double-layer and triple-layer fencing;
(2) to increase ground-based mobile surveillance systems;
(3) to deploy additional unarmed, unmanned aerial systems and manned aircraft sufficient to maintain continuous surveillance of the Southern Border;
(4) to deploy and provide capability for radio communications interoperability between U.S. Customs"

At this point, the "border security goal" will have been achieved and the provisions for citizenship can continue for those in process. It isn't clear to me whether the entire process needs to wait for this certification, or if a failure to achieve 90 percent effectiveness would just stop the process five years in. There is a lot of ambiguity here, and I've heard some complaints that the vague language could allow the Secretary of DHS to simply say the 90 percent target has been reached. And, as if deciding on a metric wasn't hard enough, DHS will of course issue its own guidance on implementation, which could really affect how the border protection strategy looks on the ground. I imagine this will be hashed and rehashed over the coming months before anything is settled.

The second major aim of the reform bill is the path to citizenship. The bill creates a new status for non-citizens in the country: Registered Provisional Immigrant (RPI). Those who meet the eligibility criteria (below) will obtain this new status, after passing a background check and paying a $500 fine, which allows them to work for any employer. The 10 year period during which these individuals (what do we call them at this point?) have RPI status, they can work and travel, but not vote or obtain means-tested federal benefits (welfare). They also become ineligible if:

o Convicted of an aggravated felony;
o Convicted of a felony;
o Convicted of 3 or more misdemeanors;
o Convicted of an offense under foreign law;
o Unlawfully Voted; and
o Inadmissible for Criminal, National Security, Public Health, or other morality grounds.

I'm not sure what "other morality grounds" means, but it (worryingly) seems to leave a lot of room for interpretation. After 10 years, individuals with RPI status can "adjust" to lawful permanent resident status provided:

o The alien maintained continuous physical presence
o They paid all taxes owed during the period that they are in status as an RPI
o They worked in the United States regularly;
o And demonstrated knowledge of Civics and English
o All people currently waiting for family and employment green cards as of the date of enactment have had their priority date become current.
o A $1,000 penalty fee is rendered

The legislation also includes the basic provisions of the so-called DREAM Act, which creates a five-year path to citizenship for young undocumented immigrants brought by parents to the U.S. illegally or in the country on expired visas. Last, according to NPR, the bill revamps the foreign worker visa scheme, creating up to 10,000 new "start up" visas for foreign entrepreneurs who create a minimum of five jobs and raise a half million dollars from investors; more visas for highly skilled foreigners with advanced degrees; increases the number of H-1B visas awarded annually from 65,000 to 110,000, in part to bump up to 25,000 visas available for those in science, technology, engineering and mathematics; and establishes low-skilled guest-worker program and new agricultural-guest-worker visa program that allows undocumented farm workers to obtain legal status.

The third major provision in the bill involves the (mandatory) use of a government database by American employers to certify that potential hires are in the country legally. This system, known as E-Verify, has been a darling of immigration hawks for years now, and will (assuming passage) be phased in within two years for firms with over 5,000 employees, three years for those with over 500, and five years for all others. When I was working in a congressional office in 2011, I remember receiving hundreds of calls and emails supporting widespread and mandatory use of E-Verify as a "demand-side" solution to illegal immigration. The proponents of E-Verify argue that if businesses both have the tools and the mandate to weed out illegal workers before hiring them, then the draw for potential undocumented migrants would be less, as they would know they couldn't get a job.

The logic here isn't wrong, but rests on some weak assumptions. First, it assumes that firms who hire undocumented workers do so unknowingly; this is demonstrably false. There may be some employers who, with E-Verify in place, eliminate their hiring of illegal workers, but I expect that those who have hired undocumented workers in the past will continue to find a way around the system. At the very least, I suppose that the mandate to use E-Verify could provide the legal tools to prosecute such employers. Another concern relates to privacy issues, as well as the potential for mistakes. Civil libertarians worry (rightly, I think) that creating another large scale database of employment information that would include US citizens creates all kinds of potential privacy hazards, and, in the case of a clerical or technical error, could wrongly deny lawful citizens their right to work.

It's still early in the debate on immigration reform, and this plan is likely to face an assault of amendments and delay before it passes the senate. As with many legislative projects these days, Representatives of the House will likely have the final say. Whereas even Senators representing "red" states such as North and South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, etc. may support a plan, their colleagues in the House may not, because their individual districts are less likely to provide an incentive due to lower numbers of migrants. In other words, whereas Marco Rubio or John McCain, for example, have a strong incentive to address immigration because their states, even if conservative, have huge Latino populations, the homogenized make up of many conservative districts allow their representatives the luxury of being more myopic. I would expect to see a clamor from these members (and their conservative PACs) to "enforce the laws already on the books," despite the fact that the Obama administration has done the most of any in recent memory to both secure the southern border and punish those in the country illegally. According to the Financial Times, "the number of deportations has hit record highs under Mr. Obama, up to about 400,000 a year." We'll see if the language in the first sections of the draft law is strong enough to assuage coopt these arguments, some of which are genuine, others are disingenuous attempts to block any reform.

Immigration reform in this country is long overdue, and I am optimistic that the gang of eight plan at least has a chance of living up to the "Economic Opportunity" promise of its title. I tend to agree with the vast majority of literature that shows immigration to be a net positive for the country. I agree with the Cato institute's assessment that immigrants are advantageous to American society because they are "self-selected on the basis of motivation, risk taking, and work ethic; they often come to the US during their prime working years; they make huge contributions to our otherwise unsustainable social safety nets (social security); and fill niches in the labor market where demand is high relative to supply, complementing rather than directly competing with American workers." Another Cato article dispels the toxic myth of the "immigrant welfare queen," noting that non-citizen immigrants are far less likely to use social welfare services than their native-born peers. This Huffington Post article digs a little deeper into the issue of how much immigrants pay in taxes and other withholding verses how much they use; it turns out immigrants, including undocumented, are a clear benefit to national budgets because they pay much more than they receive in benefits. Their impact on state and local budgets is mixed, however.

Unfortunately, (legal or illegal) immigration to the US is not a simple function of American immigration policy and border protection: it is almost as much a result of economic and security concerns in sending states. This is especially true with Mexico, which now has a net migration rate of zero, as this Pew Research Center report shows, but also with Central America. As the security situation continues to deteriorate, especially in the northern triangle, the numbers of Central Americans taking risks and crossing the border will continue to be high. In an ideal world, Congress would look at elements of foreign assistance and trade policy in conjunction with the domestic aspects of immigration. Nevertheless, this may be a step in the right direction. Its announcement by the gang of eight, and their apparent sincerity in heading off criticism in advance of its consideration in the Judicial Committee and then on the Senate floor, is a good sign.

Syria (Part II)

Courtesy Freedom House

Some more observations and good reads on the Syria crisis...

As the crisis in Syria simmers-- or boils--into its second year I am continually noticing how this conflict is seemingly redefining, or at least compelling a rethink of various aspects of US foreign policy and international relations in general.

Interestingly, I am seeing a lot less chatter about the so-called "twitter revolutions," and less breathless praise for the role of Western social media in the Arab Spring/Uprisings in general. Syria re-grounds us in the truth that revolution comes about because individuals make serious calculations and take grave, prolonged risks. In a way, this was inevitable. When the barriers to collective action were low, and speed was key, as in Tunisia, social media may play an important facilitating role in the overthrow of an autocratic government. As Arab dictators "learned" from the mistakes of their neighbors though (the "demonstration effect" doesn't just apply to activists and social movements, after all), they cracked down on demonstrations, first in Libya and then in Syria, hard. Suddenly, it wasn't enough that vast numbers of disenfranchised citizens, and youth especially, were able to mobilize in large numbers: as Qaddafi and Assad mobilized their own forces against demonstrators, peaceful protests alone quickly became insufficient. The springy revolts of Tunisia and Egypt, even Yemen, gave way to conflicts that--particularly in Syria--bear more resemblance to the drawn out proxy wars of the Cold War era.

As these conflicts settle, it will be interesting to see how the "depth" of revolt needed to oust former autocrats affects the depth of reform in each country. In other words, since Syria's revolt against the Assad regime (and its particular system of political, economic, and ethnic patronage) seems to be all-consuming, can we predict that whatever change follows his eventual (but not inevitable) fall will be comprehensive? On the other hand, since the Tunisian uprising was comparatively brief and bloodless, will reforms there more superficial? Too soon to tell, but there's a good research paper in there somewhere...

Another development I have found interesting concerns the threshold for US intervention in Syria. President Obama apparently rebuffed a handful of his senior foreign policy advisers who had advocated greater US support for Syrian rebels last fall. Since then, the administration and most of Congress seems to have settled on setting a "red line" barring the use of chemical weapons against regime opponents. Until this line is crossed, the argument goes, the US is unlikely to get more involved than it has been up to this point.

Yet in late March, it seemed that chemical weapons had been used in Syria (though both sides of the conflict blame each other) and, according to Congressman Mike Rogers, the administration's red line had been crossed. There are several dangers of setting red lines in foreign policy. First, setting a red line can alleviate the pressure on presidents to "do something," while stopping short of intervention. In this way, they can serve the same function as economic sanctions on a country, in that they are a kind of release valve for domestic pressure (admittedly, there isn't much in the case of Syria) on the administration to get involved in the crisis. Red lines send a dangerous signal to targeted regimes though: "up to this point and no further." In other words, the US has signaled that it has no intention, unilaterally or otherwise, of halting Assad's assault on Syrians unless he makes the mistake of using chemical weapons. He likely interprets this as a clear signal that he may use whatever devastating force, including Scud missiles against Syrians, as long as they are not chemical weapons, without fear of reprisal from the US, and likely the West.

The second problem with our affinity for red lines is related to the first: while sending a dangerous signal to a regime like Assad's, what happens if this red line is crossed? In other words, if we find that chemical weapons are deployed in Syria, is the US really prepared to stand by its word? One response might be that red lines, whether concerning Syria or Iran, for that matter, usually set a pretty high bar, and the language detailing any breach of said red lines tends to be vague. As a result, presidents are happy to use the red line option if a) they don't believe the offending regime will actually cross it, and b) if they can be sufficiently vague in their promised response to a potential breach so as not to actually commit themselves to action they wouldn't otherwise be interested in taking.

This raises some uncomfortable questions for US policy in the Levant. Why has the Obama administration drawn a line against chemical weapons, but not equally destructive (though maybe less gruesome?) conventional weapons? Is it possible that the administration's policy has in fact signaled to Assad that he is free to use devastating force on his own country without fear of reprisal--and, by extension, has the administration's policy actually contributed to an increased level of destruction on behalf of the Assad regime? On the other side of the coin, what does this policy signal to Syrian rebels? Knowing that the cavalry is not on its way, is it possible that the administration's policy drove elements of the rebellion into the arms of Al Qaeda (forgive the hypothetical oversimplification)? While I am usually not one to exaggerate US influence in the international affairs (actors in Syria and the region certainly have their own agency and motives for acting, independent of what the US thinks or does), the implications of US inaction here are unsettling.

As reports portray a the worsening devastation and terror that afflicts Syrians, it has become clear to many that Syria may have already passed the point of no return. Writing at The Atlantic, David Rohde has a cutting critique of Obama's Syria policy, laying the blame for the Syrian opposition's factionalization at the feet of the US president. The Guardian's Ed Vulliamy writes of a "nauseous sense of deja vu," as he recalls the World's paralysis in the days of Bosnia and Rwanda. Recognizing the end of what was once a relatively prosperous Syrian economy and the threats posed to the entire Middle East, The Economist recently called the world to action. Freedom House, too, makes a strong case for greater US involvement, citing the possible disintegration of the Syrian state and an escalation and spread of sectarian violence throughout the region.

Want to see reform and development in Cuba? Stop denying Cubans the tools to do it themselves.

The Washington Office on Latin America's posted an article on three harbingers of change in US Cuba policy late last month. The first, and most significant of these, I think, is the recent statement by US Representative Kathy Castor from the Tampa area calling for an end to the US embargo on Cuba. The authors also noted the visit of popular Cuban dissident blogger Yoani Sanchez, which in itself may signal a small but important shift in policy within Cuba. Last, they point out that the US is apparently considering removing Cuba from the State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism. While I would tend to doubt the possibility of Cuba being removed from this list any time soon, it seems that Representative Castor's position on the embargo--the first ever from Florida to oppose it--is indicative of a growing shift in attitudes among younger generations of Cuban Americans, Floridians, and Americans, more generally.

While the debate over US policy towards Cuba has raged for decades, barring major changes on the island, the status quo will likely continue for several years.  There are are however, several assumptions and implications about our Cuba policy and economic sanctions more broadly that I find worryingly absent in public debate on the issue.

One issue is the startling lack of a voice for Cubans living in Cuba. Many writers in the US portray a kind of arrogance or detached patrimonial concern for "what's best" for Cubans (I realize that I have limited standing here, advocating policy, having never been to the island, etc.). This is true on the left and the right, and includes Cuban Americans. Those who advocate reform, which include left-leaning reformists and free-trading conservatives, often do so believing that increased contact and trade between Americans and Cubans will encourage and equip Cubans to resist and overthrow the Castro regime. Those who oppose reform have traditionally cited the argument stemming from hard line Cuban American quarters that increased travel and trade "provides a source of hard currency for the Castro regime." Both positions tend to depict Cubans themselves as mechanisms--pawns even--in a quest shared by left and right to undermine communist rule: liberals hope to empower the people, while conservatives worry that the regime will itself be empowered at the expense of its people.

This manipulation (good intentions aside) for the sake of political change undergirds the logic of US sanctions levied against any regime. There are some exceptions to this generalization: in Iran, targeted sanctions are supposed the restrict the ability of elites (but clearly affect the citizenry) to finance and procure material for their nuclear project; in North Korea, sanctions famously targeted the ruling clique's taste for luxury goods. But in the majority of cases, sanctions are a blunt attempt to make the lives of enough of the citizenry miserable enough that they rise up and either overthrow the regime or force it to change or abandon the policy that triggered sanctions in the first place. The problem with our public discussion of sanctions though, is an overreliance on the the economic damage wrought by sanctions as an indicator of their success. In other words, if we see that sanctions are wreaking havoc on the economies (and lives) of a country, we generally say they are "working."

But the discussion usually stops there.

Throughout the 1990s sanctions against Iraq inflicted hyperinflation rates upwards of 4,000 percent, sky high child mortality rates, and a death toll of up to 500,000. Even in Cuba, while the economic policies of the Castro regime have done the most damage, sanctions have clearly had a major impact on the economics of families, communities, and the state--otherwise, why keep them around? Yet unlike many sanctions, those deployed against Cuba can hardly be considered "targeted sanctions." In fact, defined by the GAO as some of the most comprehensive on any country, the current embargo (recent adjustments notwithstanding) is nearly total.

In this sense, sanctions have "worked." In both the Iraqi and Cuban cases though, the people did not (or could not) force the kind of hoped-for change in policy or regime. Iraqis who did rise against Saddam in the post-Gulf War period were pummeled by chemical weapons. More recently, in Iran, another state to experience devastating sanctions, thousands who protested against rigged elections in 2009 were violently dispersed by regime thugs.

The Cuban opposition faces a different obstacle. US policy towards the island encouraged an "exit option" for many of those with the inclination or means to oppose Castro over the course of 50 years. This escape valve limited the effectiveness of groups who, absent a receptive destination for political exiles and refugees 90 miles from Cuba, would have exercised their "voice," (in the terminology of the late Albert Hirschman) and sought reform from within. (This is not to say that Cubans have not bravely resisted the Castro machine--indeed, many have paid dearly for doing so--only that the resistance movement was seriously weakened by so many having left the island.) In other words, while it seems clear that sanctions have achieved the proximate goal of damaging the Cuban economy over the course of half a century, there is no question that they have failed in the secondary goal of affecting change on the island.

Worse, many, including the widely read dissident blogger Yoani Sanchez, argue that the sanctions have only strengthened the Castro regime, allowing it to blame the US for decades of economic disaster and enabling it to survive well past its expiration date. Change to US policy then, should at the very least adopt a "first, do no harm" standard, and take away the ability of the Castros to blame US policy for their failures.

Beyond simply eliminating a tool by which the Castros oppress their own people, removing the embargo is the right thing to do because it restore the dignity of Cubans who have for generations been treated as pawns in the US government's conflict with the Castro regime. I am under no illusions that foreign policy calculus equally weighs strategic and humanitarian interests; it doesn't. Nor do I believe US policy towards Cuba is made in a political vacuum; it isn't. I am also not one to gush over recent liberalizing reforms on the island, positive though they may be. I do however join with others who see the potential for economic growth, and by extension empowerment of everyday Cubans as a result of increased trade and travel to the island, as a good in and of itself. And if an empowered Cuban populace also contributes to US policy objectives, well, maybe that is just a bonus.

North Korean rhetoric may be laughable, but it's no joke

Flickr user: Joseph A Ferris III

North Korea's bellicose pronouncements of impending doom for South Korea and the US may be laughable, but may have seriously tragic consequences for all Koreans.

I was at a dinner with friends last night following a conference on peacebuilding, when someone announced that North Korea had declared that is was in a "state of war" with South Korea, and almost by extension, the US. The group, mostly international relations experts, quickly broke into a kind of excited, mocking flurry of conversation. I confess to joining in the sarcastic hand wringing while brushing off the (remote but real) possibility of war against the US mainland.

North Korea, we are told, really does not have the capability to mount an attack against the US positions in Guam or Hawaii as it claims to be preparing, much less a strike against Washington DC or Austin, Texas, another purported target. The constant stream of threats against the "Imperialist Americans" and their South Korean "puppets," which have reached fever pitch in recent weeks, is mainly for domestic consumption, so say the experts. The Kim dynasty bases its rule on a manufactured strength through bellicosity; the new "dear leader", Kim Jung Un, is simply going through the motions of strengthening his base and consolidating his rule.

As part of this wave of threats and declarations, the North Korean state has released a series of images and video featuring Kim Jung Un touring military facilities and observing military drills. It appears that some of the images emanating from the so-called Hermit Kingdom have been doctored to show a greater strike capacity than really exists, or to hide embarrassing equipment malfunctions. One article shows eight hovercraft, four or five of which appear to be clones of the others, airbrushed to look like a more robust invasion force, conducting beach landing drills.

I admit, to me many of these images and outrageous rhetoric strike me as a government "playing war"--dressing up, building big forts, and making fantastical claims about the destruction of their enemies. It doesn't help, I suppose, that Kim and his junta of generals--who always seem to be dressed in ill-fitting uniforms and overcoats, complete with ridiculously oversized visor caps--are perpetually paying homage to the fantasies in which the pudgy Kim supposedly is born of heaven or achieved miraculous feats on the battlefield. Kim's "US Mainland Strike Plan," replete with unrealistic straight-line ballistic trajectories, sounds like something I might have dreamt up as an eight year old.

In that sense, it all seems very childlike. But no matter how ridiculous, symbols and threats have real consequences, and the room for error seems to be shrinking.

Speaking on BBC news this weeks, Duyeon Kim of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation described a situation in which the North embarks on the kind of small scale attack like the 2010 sinking of the (South Korean) Cheonan or shelling of a disputed island. In those cases, cooler heads prevailed, but as Kim explains, the South's new president Park Geun-hye has given military leaders the go-ahead to respond to Northern provocations without prior word from Seoul, thus reducing the space between miscalculation, overreach and escalation.

In such a scenario the US could easily become involved; so too could China. And again, while it seems likely that American troops and technology would save the South from becoming the "sea of fire" that the North promises, the loss of life, particularly among Northerners, would likely be devastating. Most observers pin the North Korean army at around 1.2 million. It isn't clear how many reserve forces or citizen militia could be called up in the case of war, or if this contingency force figures in to the 1.2 million number. Either way, the possibility of so many souls marching to their death for the sake of a tyrannic dictator should take some of the sheen of amusement from the North's recent gestures.

One might question my sympathy for the soldiers of a regime like Kim's, but in a state like North Korea, not unlike Nazi Germany or Stalinist Russia, it is nearly impossible, particularly for outsiders, to draw lines between the willing and the coerced--between the guilty and innocent.

Syria (Part I)

Courtesy of Freedom House

The uprising in Syria hit a milestone this month, passing the two year mark, and despite regular proclamations that Bashar Al-Assad's grip on power is reaching a tipping point, a major change in the status quo seems unlikely. The public discussion and debate over the situation in the Levant and role of the US in Syria has been strikingly muted in my opinion, so I thought I'd take this opportunity to make some observations while trying to flesh out my own position on the issue.

While I am admittedly not a specialist on the region, I think the nature of our discussion over the "Syria Question" as well as the Obama administration's maneuvering on the issue have been striking. First, to put the conflict in perspective, the death toll in Syria is believed to have passed 70,000 and produced nearly three million refugees (one million external), out of a country of roughly 20 million, in two years. Peru's conflict during the 1980s and 90s took about 69,000 lives in 20-ish years and El Salvador's extinguished about 75,000 in 12 years. The Balkanisation of the former Yugoslavia resulted in around 140,000 deaths over eight years. The 2011 uprising in Libya killed anywhere between several hundred and 25,000 (there is no official tally, though most estimates range in the 2,000-6,000 range) in nine months. Compared (crudely) to these recent internal armed conflicts, this one is extremely violent.

In economic terms, it is becoming increasingly clear that the conflict may render the country a basket case, leaving those who have fled nothing to return to. According to Al Jazeera,

"In 2010 before the uprising, Syria's gross domestic product was valued at about $57.5bn. Now it has fallen to just under $30bn - a drop of about 35 percent. The Syrian pound (LS) has lost about half its value. It used to trade at about LS47 to the dollar, it now goes for around 85, and well above 90 on the black market. And in terms of infrastructure, homes, roads and bridges across Syria will need rebuilding. One in five schools is damaged or destroyed and one in every three hospitals can no longer provide services."

To date, the US has had almost no role in Syria--no "kinetic action," no "leading from behind" (though there are reports of US weapons trainers working with rebels). The Obama administration has provided around $60 million in direct aid--all in the form of humanitarian relief, satellite telephones, radios, broadcasting equipment, computers, and survival equipment--but has shied away from providing or even facilitating the provision of weapons to Syrian armed opposition. In fact, some report that the administration has actively sought to prevent weapons from reaching portions of the armed "Rebels."

The biggest question preventing more direct or robust interaction is the question "who are the rebels?" Policy makers have been exceedingly cautious towards the Syrian opposition, who's only defining feature aside from its hatred of Assad is, judging from most reports, its fragmentation and inability to form a coherent leadership structure. Americans are rightly concerned with the complexity of the situation; Syria is not Libya (...is not Iraq, is not Afghanistan, is not Vietnam...). Syria is much bigger, has a much more sophisticated civil and military infrastructure, and is far more fractured along racial and ethnic lines. So, any foreign involvement is likely to kick up a "hornet's nest" of ethnic and sectarian tensions that would doom any reconstruction effort, the argument goes.

But is this a cop-out? Not quite. Hopefully, it is a thoughtful and humble, if lengthy appraisal of the situation by American policy makers. An article in the Atlantic quotes an anonymous US official saying, "The United States has a long history of picking winners and losers based on the guy who speaks English well...It's just trying to learn the lessons and be humble. We don't have perfect visibility into the situation. Interjecting that forcefully in an armed way has huge risk." Where was this prudence in the build up to the Iraq invasion?--I know not. Yet, I suspect that like the Iraq invasion, where there is a will there is a way. In other words, because in foreign policy issues "elites" (elected officials, diplomats, pundits, etc.) tend to have an outsize influence on public opinion (more so than domestic policy), if there was a serious interest in intervening among Democrats in the White House or Senate, or Republicans in the House, they would have made the case. With a few exceptions, no one has. Whether this is a remnant of Obama's reluctance to deal in foreign affairs during election season, our preoccupation with economic and budget woes, or the waning of the "War on Terror" narrative is unclear.

To boot, the American public is certainly not demanding their leaders get involved. Polling shows that there is no appetite in the US for involvement in Syria. According to a March YouGov poll, Americans oppose providing anything other than "non-lethal support" by a margin of 45 to 16 percent for. Our French and especially British allies are also reluctant, with about 59 percent of UK respondents opposing more active support for the rebels, including supplying arms.

Lest we forget, opponents of intervention in Iraq were quick to recall that the US supported Saddam's war against Iran in the 1980's, providing weapons and support that were eventually turned against us. It seems some in Washington have concluded that the "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" approach can backfire. Otherwise, it is likely that they would be more willing to hold their nose and support some of the shadowy groups working to overthrowing one of Iran's most important allies.

So then, are we just learning our lessons? I'm not so optimistic. Writing at The Guardian, YouGov's Joel Faulkner Rogers traces the swinging pendulum of American foreign policy in 2nd half of the 20th century--which swings (with some regularity) between idealist internationalism and principled isolationism. More than anything, I think the situation is conveniently complex and uncertain, and the potential effect of Syria on our "national interests" (as defined by those who might otherwise make the case) are sufficiently cloudy to incentivize the kind of cautious isolationism we're seeing within the foreign policy community. Rogers goes on though, to make the case that perhaps we've "over learned" the lessons of Iraq. I think there is some merit to this. Some would say that we over learned the lessons of Somalia while Rwanda burned.

While I obviously agree with the need for caution in considering putting American "blood and treasure" at risk overseas, I agree that we can't make the same assumptions and shouldn't compare Iraq and Syria too closely. We don't need to approach every scenario as a unilateral, Iraq- or Vietnam-style full scale invasion. Except for the occasional mention of a no fly zone, a la Libya, I don't hear much discussion of alternative scenarios such as an Arab League-led effort. Meanwhile, Turkey is a reluctant leader, Israel is in fortress mode, and the Gulf states are eagerly arming certain (apparently unsavory) factions of the opposition while Iran flies through complacent Iraqi skies to deliver arms to Assad . Of course, it doesn't help that we ourselves don't have much in the way of a clear "mission"--it isn't clear all Syrians do either (Foreign Policy Magazine had a great piece on the way Syrians themselves are maneuvering to protect their own interests, waiting to see how the war proceeds before throwing their lot in with either of the several sides in the conflict.). We think we know we want Assad out (which smacks of "regime change" to the Chinese and Russians), but then what?

Then what, indeed. Part II, later.

Salvadoran Maras tighten links with Mexican Zetas

A new report issued by the International Assessment and Strategy Center is making the claim that the MS-13 gang based in El Salvador has tightened its links to the hyper-violent Zetas of Mexico.

While the presence of Mexican cartels in Central America is not necessarily a new phenomenon, this new kind of collaboration is unprecedented. Whereas the maras, specifically the MS-13, traditionally provided a kind of fee for service protection racket that benefited transportistas associated with, but not members of the cartels, it seems they are now taking over some of the enterprises themselves, on behalf of the Zetas. These include, but are not limited to drug trafficking, local drug sales, and human trafficking.

Doug Farah, the report's author, argues that the MS-13 have taken advantage of a nearly year old truce between them and the M-18 gang to reorganize and insert themselves into the political arena (by delivering blocs of votes to pliable politicians in return for favors) and more directly into the international narcotics trade that has shifted dramatically to Central America and Mexico in the past decade.

This development is particularly worrying considering the fact that the Zetas themselves once served as the "enforcers" for another group, the Gulf Cartel, before branching off on their own. Once affiliates of military special forces in Mexico and Guatemala, the Zetas are now recruiting the most "talented" gun-slingers in the Salvadoran maras.

So far, we haven't seen the same level of cooperation between gangs and cartels in Guatemala or Honduras. This is largely due to the fact that in those much larger countries, cartels have an easier time moving their product themselves and don't need to cooperate with gangsters who are often regarded by the cartels as amateurish and undisciplined. In El Salvador though, the MS-13 is much more organized and hierarchical and controls a larger portion of the highly urbanized country, compared with the large swaths of rural Guatemala and Honduras in which the gangs have no presence.

Some Central Americans are taking things into their own hands. In the face of largely overwhelmed and incompetent (not to mention corrupt) security forces and some of the highest homicide rates on earth for much of the past 15 years, observers are seeing a rise in vigilante style justice in the region. For example, in 2011, Guatemalan mobs and self-defense groups lynched at least 44 suspected criminals--and these are just the cases reported and investigated by the police, which constitute a small minority of the total murders committed. The actual number of extra-judicial killings either by individuals, mobs, or private security guards, is likely much higher in Guatemala and neighboring countries.

A Gallup poll released last month shows that Central Americans widely hold youth gangs (including maras) responsible for crime in the region. In El Salvador, 67 percent blame gangs for crime, whereas in Guatemala and Honduras, 43 percent and 34 percent, respectively, blame the gangs. In the latter two countries, where narcotraffickers and organized crime seem to operate more independently of the gangs, respondents are the most likely to blame narcotraffickers in addition to gangs. Worryingly, many also see the police as one of the biggest problems with regards to crime. Eighteen percent of Hondurans blame the police themselves for crime! While other Central Americans are less likely to blame the police directly, almost no one (with the notable exception of Nicaragua) trusts the police: 84 percent of Hondurans, 76 percent of Guatemalans, and 69 percent of Salvadorans said they do not trust the police in their country.

Good readings on Chavez, Chavismo, and the future of Venezuela

Like many Latin America enthusiasts, I've found Venezuela's Hugo Chavez to be one of the most interesting and important figures in the politics of the Western Hemisphere in generations, for better or worse. His death this week may (or may not) be the end of an era, but his legacy will likely continue to have huge impacts on politics, economics, and society in Venezuela--if not throughout the region--for years to come.

Rather than pontificating on the virtues and vices of his tenure at Venezuela's helm, I thought I'd leave it up to some more qualified writers. Here you go...

Juan Forero has a good primer of the questions swirling around Chavez' absence on the Washington Post.

The New York Times has a piece focusing on el Comandante's chosen successor, Nicolas Maduro and his potential relationship with the U.S. He notes that while Maduro has already started to adopt some of Chavez' personal quirks, including his strident anti-Americanism, others think he may prove to be a more pragmatic leader.

The Washington Office on Latin America's David Smilde has a good Q&A on the Venezuelan Politics and Human Rights blog, as well as a thoughtful take on the (hopefully) permanent inclusion of Venezuela's most marginalized in the country's political system--despite continued struggles.

This editorial on The Guardian has a brief look at the challenges Chavez' own oil-fueled largess may leave for his own country--especially the poor urban masses who so benefited from it.

The BBC provides a profile of Chavez, from his training as an army paratrooper, to the 1992 coup, to the presidency. The Guardian has another, here.

Writing on The Atlantic, Francisco Toro takes a serious look at the dark side of Chavez harassment and bullying of dissident voices, especially within his own movement. He's right that while many in the U.S. may have gotten a kick out of Chavez calling President Bush the devil, or blaming the absence of life on Mars, or the earthquake in Haiti on American-style capitalism or secret "tectonic" weaponry, respectively, this stuff wasn't so amusing to many Venezuelans. He writes, "This image of El Comandante as a mere eccentric drove those of us who witnessed the progressive disintegration of Venezuela's democratic institutions around the bend. A rogue looks a lot less lovable when laughing at him can cost you your job, your property, your livelihood, your freedom."

The Miami Herald's Andres Oppenheimer compares Chavez' legacy to that of Argentina's Peron. I agree that Chavez is likely to be little more than a cultural icon beyond Venezuela from here on out, and that Chavez has not been the only one who's helped the poor (Peru and Chile--hardly bastions of leftist government in the last decade--did even more to alleviate poverty than Chavez). But, his memory will certainly prove useful to all sorts of electoral groups vying for power--whether on the left or right. I think this has already begun to happen; Chavez' opponent in October's election, Henrique Capriles, seemed forced to accept the continued existence of many of Chavez' most popular social programs. This could last for decades.

Al Jazeera English has a handful of op-eds looking at various aspects of Chavez' legacy. Janvieve Williams Comrie looks at the impacts of Chavez on race relations and the improved position of many ethnic and racial minorities, both in Venezuela and throughout the region. This is one of the least talked about aspects of Chavismo, especially in the U.S. media, but may be one of Chavez' most important and long-lasting impacts.

Mark Weisbrot, of the Center for Economic and Policy Research, has a favorable view of Chavez' legacy on poverty in the country and for Latin American independence from the U.S. Manuela Picq and Belen Fernandez also write (mostly sympathetically) on the ability of Chavez to incorporate Venezuela's long marginalized lower classes into the country's politics and economy. Particularly interesting are Picq's thoughts the rise of the Left in Latin America during the past 14 years or so. I think Chavez' role in this respect is often exaggerated (I give more credit to moderate leftists in some Mexican states, and to Brazil's "Lula"), but not unimportant.

Also writing on Al Jazeera, Mike Allison, a Central America expert, has some insights into how Chavez' death might impact politics in the region and how Chavez the figure might compare to other Latin American figures such as Allende, Arbenz, or Peron. I'd also recommend reading Allison's blog; he's prolific and really insightful.

The Christian Science Monitor's blog, the Latin American Monitor, has a handful of posts on the subject of Chavez and his succession, one of which focuses specifically on the character of Nicolas Maduro, who has already begun to "channel his inner Chavez."

Another good blog, Bloggings by Boz, looks at the possibility of Venezuela (indeed, Latin America) moving beyond the timeless figure of the caudillo. This is especially good reading for gringos (myself included), who may be more prone to look at Latin American politics and leadership through jaded eyes, wondering who (read: which new caudillo) will replace Chavez.

If anyone has any good suggested reading on the future of the Venezuelan party system, I'd love to see it; I think this is one of the more uncertain and unexplored issues, beyond the simple question of who will govern in Venezuela. Chavez came to power following the collapse of one of Latin America's most durable two-party systems in the 1980s and 90s. His career has obviously destroyed any remnants of this punto fijo system--so, where to now?