Syria (Part I)

Courtesy of Freedom House

The uprising in Syria hit a milestone this month, passing the two year mark, and despite regular proclamations that Bashar Al-Assad's grip on power is reaching a tipping point, a major change in the status quo seems unlikely. The public discussion and debate over the situation in the Levant and role of the US in Syria has been strikingly muted in my opinion, so I thought I'd take this opportunity to make some observations while trying to flesh out my own position on the issue.

While I am admittedly not a specialist on the region, I think the nature of our discussion over the "Syria Question" as well as the Obama administration's maneuvering on the issue have been striking. First, to put the conflict in perspective, the death toll in Syria is believed to have passed 70,000 and produced nearly three million refugees (one million external), out of a country of roughly 20 million, in two years. Peru's conflict during the 1980s and 90s took about 69,000 lives in 20-ish years and El Salvador's extinguished about 75,000 in 12 years. The Balkanisation of the former Yugoslavia resulted in around 140,000 deaths over eight years. The 2011 uprising in Libya killed anywhere between several hundred and 25,000 (there is no official tally, though most estimates range in the 2,000-6,000 range) in nine months. Compared (crudely) to these recent internal armed conflicts, this one is extremely violent.

In economic terms, it is becoming increasingly clear that the conflict may render the country a basket case, leaving those who have fled nothing to return to. According to Al Jazeera,

"In 2010 before the uprising, Syria's gross domestic product was valued at about $57.5bn. Now it has fallen to just under $30bn - a drop of about 35 percent. The Syrian pound (LS) has lost about half its value. It used to trade at about LS47 to the dollar, it now goes for around 85, and well above 90 on the black market. And in terms of infrastructure, homes, roads and bridges across Syria will need rebuilding. One in five schools is damaged or destroyed and one in every three hospitals can no longer provide services."

To date, the US has had almost no role in Syria--no "kinetic action," no "leading from behind" (though there are reports of US weapons trainers working with rebels). The Obama administration has provided around $60 million in direct aid--all in the form of humanitarian relief, satellite telephones, radios, broadcasting equipment, computers, and survival equipment--but has shied away from providing or even facilitating the provision of weapons to Syrian armed opposition. In fact, some report that the administration has actively sought to prevent weapons from reaching portions of the armed "Rebels."

The biggest question preventing more direct or robust interaction is the question "who are the rebels?" Policy makers have been exceedingly cautious towards the Syrian opposition, who's only defining feature aside from its hatred of Assad is, judging from most reports, its fragmentation and inability to form a coherent leadership structure. Americans are rightly concerned with the complexity of the situation; Syria is not Libya (...is not Iraq, is not Afghanistan, is not Vietnam...). Syria is much bigger, has a much more sophisticated civil and military infrastructure, and is far more fractured along racial and ethnic lines. So, any foreign involvement is likely to kick up a "hornet's nest" of ethnic and sectarian tensions that would doom any reconstruction effort, the argument goes.

But is this a cop-out? Not quite. Hopefully, it is a thoughtful and humble, if lengthy appraisal of the situation by American policy makers. An article in the Atlantic quotes an anonymous US official saying, "The United States has a long history of picking winners and losers based on the guy who speaks English well...It's just trying to learn the lessons and be humble. We don't have perfect visibility into the situation. Interjecting that forcefully in an armed way has huge risk." Where was this prudence in the build up to the Iraq invasion?--I know not. Yet, I suspect that like the Iraq invasion, where there is a will there is a way. In other words, because in foreign policy issues "elites" (elected officials, diplomats, pundits, etc.) tend to have an outsize influence on public opinion (more so than domestic policy), if there was a serious interest in intervening among Democrats in the White House or Senate, or Republicans in the House, they would have made the case. With a few exceptions, no one has. Whether this is a remnant of Obama's reluctance to deal in foreign affairs during election season, our preoccupation with economic and budget woes, or the waning of the "War on Terror" narrative is unclear.

To boot, the American public is certainly not demanding their leaders get involved. Polling shows that there is no appetite in the US for involvement in Syria. According to a March YouGov poll, Americans oppose providing anything other than "non-lethal support" by a margin of 45 to 16 percent for. Our French and especially British allies are also reluctant, with about 59 percent of UK respondents opposing more active support for the rebels, including supplying arms.

Lest we forget, opponents of intervention in Iraq were quick to recall that the US supported Saddam's war against Iran in the 1980's, providing weapons and support that were eventually turned against us. It seems some in Washington have concluded that the "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" approach can backfire. Otherwise, it is likely that they would be more willing to hold their nose and support some of the shadowy groups working to overthrowing one of Iran's most important allies.

So then, are we just learning our lessons? I'm not so optimistic. Writing at The Guardian, YouGov's Joel Faulkner Rogers traces the swinging pendulum of American foreign policy in 2nd half of the 20th century--which swings (with some regularity) between idealist internationalism and principled isolationism. More than anything, I think the situation is conveniently complex and uncertain, and the potential effect of Syria on our "national interests" (as defined by those who might otherwise make the case) are sufficiently cloudy to incentivize the kind of cautious isolationism we're seeing within the foreign policy community. Rogers goes on though, to make the case that perhaps we've "over learned" the lessons of Iraq. I think there is some merit to this. Some would say that we over learned the lessons of Somalia while Rwanda burned.

While I obviously agree with the need for caution in considering putting American "blood and treasure" at risk overseas, I agree that we can't make the same assumptions and shouldn't compare Iraq and Syria too closely. We don't need to approach every scenario as a unilateral, Iraq- or Vietnam-style full scale invasion. Except for the occasional mention of a no fly zone, a la Libya, I don't hear much discussion of alternative scenarios such as an Arab League-led effort. Meanwhile, Turkey is a reluctant leader, Israel is in fortress mode, and the Gulf states are eagerly arming certain (apparently unsavory) factions of the opposition while Iran flies through complacent Iraqi skies to deliver arms to Assad . Of course, it doesn't help that we ourselves don't have much in the way of a clear "mission"--it isn't clear all Syrians do either (Foreign Policy Magazine had a great piece on the way Syrians themselves are maneuvering to protect their own interests, waiting to see how the war proceeds before throwing their lot in with either of the several sides in the conflict.). We think we know we want Assad out (which smacks of "regime change" to the Chinese and Russians), but then what?

Then what, indeed. Part II, later.