Conditional Cash Transfers and School Attendance

Flickr user: kinderpate

The World Bank released a paper last month looking at the effects of Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programs on school attendance in rural Burkina Faso. As I've looked at similar programs in Latin America, and am generally a proponent of such schemes, I thought I'd share a few interesting points.

CCTs have been growing in popularity throughout the developing world and especially in Latin America--particularly Mexico and Brazil. The idea behind these schemes is to develop long-term human capacity in the form of increased nutritional, health, and educational outcomes, and to break the inter-generational cycle of poverty that afflicts implementing countries.

The "Conditional" in the CCT theoretically has a number of benefits, both for donors and recipients. For donors, many have remarked that conditionalities make cash transfers (from governments to citizens) more palatable to politicians. On the other hand, conditionalities provide a mechanism by which recipients are incentivized to do things like send their kids to school (rather than work or beg) and get medical checkups and immunization for women and young children. Some programs have additional benefits such as providing female heads of household with increased independence or providing a source of income security that allows families to access credit or purchase durable goods (Abhifit Banerjee and Esther Duflo's book Poor Economics has a great section on the difficulties poor people face in accessing credit and the benefits of income security for development).

The World Bank study isolates one particular theoretical benefit of CCTs, and asks to what extent conditional versus unconditional cash transfers really increase school attendance. The results were interesting; CCTs and UCTs (unconditional...) had similar positive impacts on enrollment for "children who are traditionally favored by parents for school participation, including boys, older children, and higher ability children." These are children that parents may "prioritize" with regards to obtaining education; parents already want to send them to school. So, cash transfers--with or without conditionalities attached--help relieve the burden (or opportunity costs) of sending these kids to school.

Where the conditional transfers excelled however, was in improving enrollment of what the authors called "marginal children"--kids who are less likely than the first group to go to school, or who go to school less often. These include girls, younger children, and children with lower abilities. For these children, cash benefits led to a statistically significant increase in enrollment of over 20 percent for girls, 37 percent for younger children, and 36 percent for low ability children, compared to the average enrollment for these groups. UCTs, on the other hand, saw either a statistically insignificant increase in enrollment, or a much smaller enrollment for these groups.

In other words, CCTs seem to excel in encouraging school attendance among the most marginalized groups of marginalized populations, and provide a pretty good bang for the buck.

Keep in mind, these results obtain in Burkina Faso, a relatively small rural country in the West African Sahel. I would be interested to see a comparative look at CCTs in more urbanized countries, or geographically larger countries, for example. In addition, this study defines educational outcomes mostly in terms of enrollment and attendance; education observers in this country well know that educational outcomes rest on a variety of other factors, not the least of which include the quality of the schools and teachers or the availability of textbooks and classroom technology, for example. These elements generally lie within the supply side of the educational attainment equation, however, and it is becoming ever more apparent that CCTs at least have a strong and positive impact on the demand side of things.

First Fruits of the Brazilian Truth Commission

Brazil is learning startling truths about what took place during the country's period of military dictatorship (1964-1985). The president of Brazil's National Human Rights Commission (Comissão Nacional de Direitos Humanos) Wadih Damous, demanded this week that along with the thousands of politically motivated tortures that took place under military rule, abuse and torture of the children of prisoners be investigated.

This comes barely a week after the high profile suicide of Carlos Alexandre Azevedo, son of a well known Brazilian journalist. Azevedo was captured with his mother in 1974 and apparently abused by the jailers--to torture his watching mother--when he was not yet two years old. Azevedo suffered from numerous social and psychological traumas as a result of the abuse he suffered as a toddler, apparently never recovering. Other reports of the willingness of Brazilian authorities to abuse the children of suspected subversives have surfaced in recent months, though it is not yet clear if the practice was as systemic as the Argentinian corollary, where children were systematically taken from their parents (who were usually then killed) and given to be raised by members or friends of the ruling junta.

The National Truth Commission (Comissão Nacional da Verdade), established May of 2012, has been looking into disappearances, torture, rape, and other abuses that took place during Brazil's "dirty war" against suspected leftists and insurgents. On Monday, the Commission revealed that it had identified dozens of individuals--mostly military and police officials, but some civilians--who had been involved with certain atrocities.

The Commission has run into strong criticism though, as important segments of the public are strongly resistant to any digging around in the unpleasantries of the past. Many are simply too young or care too little about what they see as relatively minor abuses of a distant past. An estimated 500 individuals disappeared during the twenty year period, while another 9,000 were jailed and tortured in brutal crackdowns. The Commission estimates that approximately 50,000 were arrested in 1964--the first year of military rule--alone. Compare these numbers to the more spectacular horrors of Peru or Guatemala for example where nearly 70,000 and 200,000 were killed, respectively (or tiny Uruguay, where around 200 disappearances had a much more pervasive effect); much of Brazilian society--now a country of around 200 million--was relatively untouched by state violence during the period.

On the other hand, since Brazil passed a military amnesty in 1979 (which was upheld in 2010 by the Supreme Court), no prosecutions will result from the Commission's work. Still, the body hopes to name names, and to provide a deeper and clearer history of what actually happened during this dark period. And, digging up the truth is not just an academic exercise. The history, and especially the personal histories that emerge during this process (the Commission has a two year mandate) could have unimaginable consequences on Brazilian society and politics, not to mention the families and societies that lived them.

It will be interesting to see what the emergence of a (potentially) new collective knowledge and understanding of this period could do for the prospects for justice in Brazil. If the Commission does reveal atrocities or abuse that were, perhaps, more extensive or more heinous than generally accepted, could a civil-social groundswell provide the kind of political momentum to revisit the amnesty issue a la Uruguay and Argentina? Too soon to say, for sure. But, it seems a positive sign that Brazil is dealing with this difficult part of its past. Combined with last year's high-profile corruption scandal (Mensalão), which resulted in 35 convictions in a country that does nearly as well on corruption indexes as it does in the World Cup, the Truth Commission's first fruits, though devastatingly bitter, are a step forward.

Uruguay takes a step backwards on Human Rights

On Friday February 22, the Uruguayan Supreme Court put a stop to human rights trials stemming from that country's military dictatorship during the 1970s and 80s by calling a law that had turned over a 1986 amnesty unconstitutional.

The amnesty, passed by popular referendum in the years following Uruguay's return to democracy, was overturned in late 2011. The law, passed following an Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruling that declared Uruguay's amnesty in conflict with the country's treaty obligations, eliminated the statute of limitations on cases against former military and police officials alleged to be responsible for disappearances and other atrocities under the dictatorship.

However, the Supreme Court found this week that the 2011 law, passed by the president Jose Mujica's Broad Front (Frente Amplio) following several unsuccessful attempts to reverse the amnesty by referendum, to be unconstitutional. The finding, while not entirely unexpected, was widely denounced by human rights activists in Uruguay and beyond. President Mujica's party released a statement on its website denouncing the finding as an "obstacle in the search for truth and justice legitimately claimed by social organizations and victims of state sponsored terrorism."

Opponents of the decision vowed to take the fight against the amnesty law to the Inter-American Court, and to take legal action against the Supreme Court itself.

The finding affects dozens of cases brought by families and survivors of the military regime, which is believed to have disappeared around 200 individuals and tortured thousands more. While the scale of the violence that shook Uruguay during the Cold War seems perhaps less horrific than say, that of Peru or Guatemala (where nearly 70,000 and 200,000 individuals were killed, respectively, and countless more tortured, raped, beaten, etc.), the issue is highly divisive after 20 years of democracy in this country of just over three million. The finding is unlikely to be the last word on trials for abuses though, and human rights activists could find that the ruling only galvanizes their movement, providing the impetus to overturn the amnesty by other, constitutional means.

Rios Montt Trial to go forward - sooner than expected

On Tuesday, a judge in Guatemala's "High Impact Court" (Tribunal de Mayor Riesgo) notified the parties involved in the trial of former de facto head of state Efrain Rios Montt that the trial will begin sooner than anticipated. After reviewing complaints from representatives of Rios Montt and Jose Mauricio Rodriguez Sanchez (former intelligence director, also to stand trial for war crimes), the court dismissed claims of impartiality and, surprisingly, moved the date of the trial from mid-August to March 19 of this year.

Guatemalan courts have an historic lack of independence, frequently subject to congressional manipulation and "subordinance" to the president, according to an October presentation in Washington by Supreme Court Justice Cesar Barrientos. Guatemala's High Impact Courts, a recent development in the country's judicial system, are regarded as a vast improvement in the independence and provision of rule of law. The new courts began operating in 2009, and are dedicated to hearing cases relating to drug trafficking, organized crime, money laundering, and human rights abuse, among other things.

The proceedings of the High Impact Courts are highly transparent, according to Justice Yazmin Barrios, and the judges' identities are not hidden. As a result, judges frequently face defamation campaigns and intimidation by those who oppose their work. As the trial moves closer, it is very possible that we will see renewed attacks on the Court itself, the justices, and perhaps the victims or survivors of victims of the war as supporters of the defendants feel increasingly cornered.

The trial itself then, will be a huge test for the Guatemalan judicial system. A fair and impartial trial will go a long way (but certainly won't be enough) in strengthening the professionalism and independence of the judiciary. And, it could be a major step in rejecting a history that legitimizes the atrocities (including genocide) that occured in the early 1980s, offered by regime supporters and other potential beneficiaries of judicial impotence.

Brazil to expand anti-poverty measures

Blog do Planalto

The Brazilian government announced this week that it plans to expand the program Brazil Without Poverty (Brasil sem Miseria) to provide benefits to about 2.5 million families. The program, launched in June of last year, is a key part of president Dilma Rousseff's initiative to lift millions out of poverty and builds on popular programs begun under Lula's Zero Hunger (Fome Zero) campaign.

Currently, about half of the rural Brazilian population--about 15 percent of the total population--lives in poverty, while around 16 million (eight percent) live in extreme poverty, defined as living on less than about US$44 per day. Poverty in the country is particularly concentrated in the "semi-arid" northeast of the country, where a despite decade of impressive national growth, conditional cash transfers, and other development efforts, much of the population is extremely poor. As a result, Dilma's Brazil Without Poverty program seeks to fill in the gaps left by the popular Bolsa Familia or the Program for the Acquisition of Food, a well-functioning local agriculture development program that has helped bolster the production and sustainability of local agriculture, rather than simply alleviating the ravages of poverty and hunger.

President Rousseff's goal is to reach all 16 million living in extreme poverty.

One of the ways in which this program fills in these gaps is by actively seeking and registering families who are eligible, but have not yet participated in one of several other development schemes:

Active Search (Busca Ativa) is the strategy adopted by Brasil Sem Miseria to find and register all extremely poor families that have not been located yet. Developed in the municipal level, it is implemented by social assistance mobile teams and by the increase in the transfers of Federal Government resources to city governments. Thanks to Busca Ativa, 687 thousand families previously “invisible” were included in the Cadastro Único in its first year of existence, and are already receiving the Bolsa Família and other social benefits.

The government claims it has already lifted around 22 million people out of poverty over the past decade (while it is difficult to distinguish the particular effects of various specific projects from the effects of overall robust national economic growth throughout the period, most scholars who look at Brazil's progress agree that active anti-poverty programming deserves a significant amount of credit).

While the reach and cost of Brazil's development portfolio is impressive (this new expansion will bring targeted social spending via Bolsa Familia to about US$12 billion), its biggest downfalls so far seem to be in providing the infrastructure or follow-through for recipients who receive benefits. For example, with the Bolsa Familia program, evaluators frequently find that where recipients are required to receive medical checkups (especially pregnant women and young children) the clinics that serve the area are often inaccessible and/or under equipped. And, while benefits make it easier to send children to school more regularly, the schools serving poor rural areas in Brazil are often inadequate. Finally, the sheer number of poor Brazilians--urban and rural--make coverage a real challenge; some qualified families are simply left out.

Roll Pink Tide Roll

Flickr user: Presidencia de la República del Ecuador

The Left in Latin America is breathing a collective sigh of relief today, as two of its most important standard bearers--Venezuela's Hugo Chavez and Ecuador's Rafael Correa--signalled a continuation of progressive governance in the region.

Ecuadorian president Rafael Correa handily won reelection on Sunday, and early reporting suggests his Alianza Pais party may win a slight majority in Congress (though figures won't be official for some days). While most observers predicted a win, either in the preliminary or runoff phase, few expected the overwhelming 57 percent showing for Correa. Correa has already made history, as Ecuador's first president to win a free and fair reelection, and now as Ecuador's longest serving democratically elected president.

Sunday's result extends Correa's term through 2017, and gives the U.S.-trained economist a renewed mandate to deepen his "Citizen's Revolution." Many expect the president to double down on (much needed) infrastructure development and social spending, extending the state's role in the oil-reliant economy and supporting further integration among ALBA (Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas)countries. Correa is also unlikely to relax his harsh treatment towards opposition media.

Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez--no doubt ALBA's most important figure--alerted Venezuelans to his return from Havana early Monday with a tweet thanking God and his people. Chavez had hardly been heard from since his December 11th departure to Cuba for cancer treatment. In the meantime, rumors and speculation swirled relentlessly around the president's fitness for office(not to mention strong challenges to the legality of Chavez' status as president after missing his inauguration in January), throwing some doubt on the future of the Left in Latin America sin Chavez.

Chavez has still not disclosed the type of cancer with which he is afflicted, and despite previous assurances of his health, questions about his health ability to govern are likely to follow him for years. Former presidential challenger Enrique Capriles quickly welcomed the president back to a country facing massive economic, social, and security challenges, "Buenos días, leyendo la noticia que regresó el Presidente, bienvenido sea a Venezuela, ojalá que su retorno genere cordura en su Gob" (Good morning, reading the news about the President's return, welcome back to Venezuela, hopefully your return brings some sanity back to the government). Caracas is one of the most violent cities on earth, inflation is rampant, there is a serious housing shortage, and Venezuela's infrastructure is crumbling.

This week's developments likely mean that the Left will continue ruling in Venezuela and Ecuador at least through 2017 (Chavez' term is scheduled to end in 2019). Chavez' return should also reassure governments in Cuba, Nicaragua, and others who benefit from his government's economic largess. As I have written previously, while the tenure of both figures followed periods of political-institutional breakdown (chronic, in the case of Ecuador), neither has done much for long-term political stability in their countries. And, while their economic legacies may in fact be mixed (impressive poverty reductions, unsustainable fiscal and economic policy), their quasi-authoritarian legacies could very well undermine any gains made.

Elections in Ecuador

Ecuadorians go to the polls this Sunday to elect a president and congress. Most analysts predict a win for sitting president Rafael Correa, though if he doesn't win an outright majority (or at least 40 percent of the vote with an advantage of at least 10 percent over the runner up), he may face a runoff.

The opposition to Correa, much like the country's political system in general, is fractured (he faces seven challengers from a myriad of parties and movements). The president faces his strongest challenge on the right from Guillermo Lasso, a former banker who heads CREO (Movement Creating Opportunities). According to recent polling from ARCOP, a Mexican firm, Lasso comes in second with 26 percent to Correa's 39 percent. This result would require a runoff, tentatively scheduled for April 7.

Click here for a good breakdown of the various factions vying for power in Ecuador.

Behind Lasso is Alberto Acosta, onetime ally of Correa and co-founder of the left-leaning Alianza Pais, the party which Correa now heads. Acosta, heading a coalition of groups frustrated with Correa's authoritarianism, (particularly his continued assault on Ecuador's press) is unlikely to reach the runoff stage. However, his group could draw congressional seats away from the Alianza Pais, and frustrate the president's hopes at achieving a majority in the National Assembly, which is set to elect 137 members this week.

This week's elections will likely have far-reaching impacts on Ecuadorian economics and politics. While Correa's aggressive "anti-imperialist" rhetoric (generally aimed at international monetary institutions and the U.S.) and abuse of the media typically catch the headlines in the U.S., his development policy may be a more positive legacy. Under his tenure, poverty in Ecuador has dropped from around 37 percent to about 27 percent--still astronomical, but impressive. Ecuador's conditional cash transfer program, Bono de Desarrollo Humano, deserves some recognition here. The president is also eager to showoff new roads, schools, and medical clinics funded by heavy borrowing--mainly from China, since Ecuador has been a pariah of lending institutions since its 2008 debt default. While his economic policies may prove to be unsustainable, they have yielded real (if still tentative) results.

Correa's political-institutional legacy is likely to be more mixed, at best. Ecuador has a very poorly institutionalized electoral system, which frequently encourages volatile elections, dramatic policy swings, patronage and clientelism, short-sided economic policy, and authoritarianism, among other problems. Many of these terms apply to Correa's Ecuador, though the president cannot be held solely responsible for a poorly institutionalized system--the country went through seven presidents in ten years, prior to electing Correa. Nevertheless, Correa has built a machine centered--not unlike Venezuela's Chavistas--around a single personality. While the system may seem relatively (for Ecuador) stable at the moment, Correa's decline or departure (see for example: Chavez, Hugo) could result in any number of political upheavals, none of which are likely to contribute to Ecuador's future economic development.