Some possible scenarios for Venezuelan succession

Flickr user: Globovisión

As Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez enters his third month of convalescence in Havana, following an operation and serious lung infection in December, the struggle for power has already begun in Venezuela. Univision has a quick guide to some of the possible scenarios for succession to the presidency. Here are some of the scenarios considered:

Chavismo continues...
In this first and perhaps most likely scenario, at least in the near future, representatives from Chavez' own movement maintain control of the levers of power. In this case, the two most likely candidates to succeed the President would be Vice President Nicolas Maduro or Diosdado Cabello, president of the National Assembly. Chavez sent a strong signal by designating Maduro as his chosen successor (should he not return from Cuba) before undergoing treatment. With six years as Chavez' Foreign Minister under his belt, Maduro, a former bus driver, also apparently has something of a rapport with the Castro brothers in Cuba. His foreign experience is particularly important to Chavismo, a movement that under Chavez, has had strong regional and global ambitions.

Cabello, on the other hand, has more of a constitutional basis for assuming the presidency. Moreover, the president of the National Assembly also wields important influence in military sectors and within the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV). Many note however, that Cabello lacks foreign credentials and doesn't possess anywhere near the kind of charisma necessary to head a movement so closely linked to a single persona.

Internal power struggle...
If either of the two leaders most closely associated with Chavismo fail to fill the power vacuum created by a possible Chavez departure, there could be a wider struggle for power between leaders on the periphery of Chavismo, weilding their own powerful constituencies. In such a situation, analysts predict that Francisco Arias Cardenas, governor of the large oil-producing state of Zulia; Jose Vielma More, governor of Tachira; or Rosa Virginia Chavez, the President's daughter, would vie for power. Arias Cardenas, one of the original members of Chavez' 1992 coup attempt, would be a powerful player if the PSUV were to hold primaries to select a successor candidate--though Arias fell out of favor with Chavez and his closest advisers in recent years.

Jose Vielma Mora, another member of the 1992 coup cohort and current governor, is another possible candidate. His credentials come from the fact that he is apparently one of the Chavez administration's most efficient functionaries. His handicap is the low profile he has kept since the 1992 coup attempt.

Rosa Virginia has an important claim to the mantle of Chavismo as the President's oldest daughter, de facto first lady, and a close advisor. While she has little experience with governing, analysts predict that she could play more of a "kingmaker" role in a potential transition.

Outsider opposition...
The Venezuelan opposition sees a possible path to power in the case of Chavez' death. This could come about through an agreement among and between factions of Chavez' movement, or through a strong showing in elections, which should be called in the case of the President's permanent absence. The opposition has been notoriously divided in the past decade, and any rise to national power would likely rest on the shoulders of the governor of the state of Miranda, Henrique Capriles. Capriles recently came the closest to dethroning Chavez, losing the October 2012 election with 45 percent of the vote. In the absence of Chavez' strong unifying effect for those opposed to his policies, it is unclear whether Capriles could hold together various opposing factions and put together a strong coalition.

"An African Solution to an African Problem"

Last week, Senegal began setting up a court to try former Chadian dictator Hissein Habre for crimes against humanity. Habre led Chad between mid-1982 and 1990, coming to power and being forced out via coups. Under his command, the armed forces of Chad repelled attacks from Muammar Gaddafi's Libya in the north of the country, and fought a simmering civil war throughout the 1980s marked by torture, disappearances, and executions of regime opponents.

An estimated 40,000 people were killed and 200,000 tortured under Habre's rule.

Following a coup in 1990, Habre fled for Senegal, where he has remained under some degree of protection since. Belgium sought to have Habre extradited to stand trial in the Hague in 2005. Senegalese president Wade, who like many heads of state, worry about the precedent of trying leaders for war crimes, resisted calls to hand over Habre.

After the defeat of Abdoulaye Wade in 2012 however, Senegalese President Macky Sall negotiated the creation of an African Union-mandated court, paving the way for trial of the former dictator.

Writing on Aljazeera, Chandra Lekha Sriram observes that, assuming Habre does eventually stand trial, "What we might be seeing is a shift from the narrative of Habré as an African Pinochet, and international justice and the ICC as neocolonial, to the fruition of one possible model for "African solutions to African problems".

A possible "African solution" is hugely significant for several reasons. First, as Sriram again points out, this case would represent the first time a country's national court tries another country's former head of state for crimes against humanity. This model would provide an alternative path to bring political leaders to justice in addition to domestic courts, ad hoc international tribunals, or the oft-maligned International Criminal Court.

Second, and perhaps more significantly, the Senegalese model may set an important precedent for trying for former heads of state, and may build on a growing collection of jurisprudence and rulings breaking down the once insurmountable barriers to accountability for war crimes committed at the highest political levels.

Katherine Sikkink's 2011 book Justice Cascade (W.W. Norton & Co.) gives an excellent accounting of the barriers overcome in recent decades. The first countries to try former members of an oppressive military regime were Greece and Portugal, in the mid-1970s. These trials, while significant in that they were able to charge former leaders, were not human rights trials. They were trials for treason and overthrowing the state. Nevertheless, these trials “broke the back” of regime hardliners and supporters, and thus opened the door to the possibility of punishment for other abuses. 

The next experiment with trials of members of a former regime came in mid-1980s Argentina, when that country tried nine members of the former military regime. In the case of Argentina, however, prosecutors did in fact try—and convict—members of the military junta for human rights abuses committed between 1976 and 1983. As prosecutors continued to target low-level military officers (rather than just political-military leaders), this provoked a backlash in segments of Argentine society and regime supporters launched a coup attempt in 1987. This instance is hailed by some as proof that human rights trials destabilize new democracies.

Sikkink argues, however, that despite the backlash, coup attempt, and the amnesty laws and pardons that followed, the symbolic societal rejection of immunity for human rights abuses and the new relationship between the Argentine state and military were firmly in place. Furthermore, the initial successes in Argentina had already changed people’s beliefs and expectations about justice in transitional contexts throughout the globe. In the mid-1970s, when Greece and Portugal were experimenting with transitional justice, the idea of prosecuting heads of state for human rights abuses was unthinkable. After the Argentine trials, it was not.

Further, the Argentine trials informed a series of international treaties and conventions including the Convention Against Torture, The Genocide Convention, and the International Criminal Court--all of which embody and codify what was once a novel approach to international law: individual responsibility.

This idea of individuals—rather than states—being tried for crimes against humanity, combined with the ability of individuals to file complaints of human rights violations (in Argentina) is now a cornerstone of international human rights law.

Heads of state and senior political leaders have now been tried in a variety of fora: domestic courts (Pinochet, Fujimori, and now Efrain Rios Montt), international tribunals (the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda),  and the International Criminal Court, which handed down its conviction of Thomas Lubanga last year.

The Senegalese model is a positive step forward for accountability, especially in Africa. While any number of factors could prevent the trial--not expected to start until 2015--from yielding a ruling (death of the 70 year old defendant, political meddling, mishandling of evidence, etc.), the precedent and possibility of prosecution for current and future African (and non-African!) leaders are in themselves a positive development.

Plague strikes coffee crops in Central America

Coffee growers in Central America and southern Mexico are experiencing a widespread plague of "rust" produced by the fungus Hemileia vastatrix. In Costa Rica, authorities expect 10,000 growers to be affected in a period estimated to last two to three years. In Guatemala, where a majority of growers are small operations, the situation is much worse. Of the 270,000 hectares planted with coffee, approximately 193,000 hectares (around 70 percent) are affected by the fungus. The situation is expected to last three to five years and affect over 100,000 people.

Nils Leporowski, President of the National Coffee Association of Guatemala (ANACAFE), noted that, though the rust has affected crops throughout the region previously, climate change has created a favorable environment for the offending fungus. "In the last three years the climatic conditions have favored the propagation of the fungus, due to a combination of higher temperatures and rains."

Guatemala's Agriculture Minister Elmer Lopez says the 2012-13 coffee harvest (10/12-9/13) is expected to shrink 15 percent on the year, while the next year's harvest could lose as much as 40 percent.

Growers in the region will not benefit from an increase in prices that might be expected to accompany such declines in production, however. Coffee prices have only "limited potential" for decline this year, according to the International Coffee Organization. While Central American crops have been hit hard, Brazil and Colombia (which is recovering from its own coffee pest outbreak) are reporting bumper crops

Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica have all declared states of emergency to allow government dollars to flow to affected areas. Guatemalan president Otto Perez Molina ordered about $10 million in federal funds be made available to fight the blight.

Brazil to monitor Bolivian skies with drones

Brazil and Bolivia are in the final stages of reaching a deal to allow Brazil to operate unmanned aerial drones over the border with Bolivia. According to BBC Mundo, the deal--the details of which will be released only upon final approval--is expected to see Brazil play an increasingly lead role in counter narcotics operations throughout the Southern Cone.

The use of drones in Brazil, soon over neighboring countries' airspace, is increasing in the context of decreased U.S. presence in the region and an increased drug trade through the Southern Cone. In 2008, the Bolivian government kicked out the American DEA following accusations of "political meddling." Over the same time period, research is beginning to show an increasing flow of drugs through Brazilian, Argentine, and Uruguayan ports. Cocaine consumption in the U.S. has declined nearly 40 percent in the last decade, according to government figures, while consumption in Europe has risen. The European market is now nearly the size of the U.S. market, and Europeans generally pay more per kilo for cocaine.

Increased operations along the U.S.-Mexican border and cooperation with Central American interdiction efforts has put pressure on traffickers seeking to bring their product to market--as a result, the European market, and shipping routes from the southern cone (via west Africa) have become increasingly attractive. The notorious "tri-border" area between Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina, has become somewhat of a hot spot for drug movers, organized crime, and according to some reporting, Hezbollah.

The 14 Heron model drones, purchased from the Israeli firm Israel Aerospace Industries for a total of around $350 million, are capable of flying for 37 hours straight, and can cover over 1000 kilometers.

Bolivian Ambassador to Brazil Jerjes Justiniano said "Bolivia has a very positive view" towards anti-drug cooperation with Brazil. It wasn't clear whether the Brazilians anticipated participating with Bolivia on the ground, when it comes to destroying illicit plantations or laboratories.

Sunshine and Shadows: New light shed on Obama administration's drone war casts darker shadows on clandestine operations

The Obama administration's execution of shadowy drone operations in Yemen, Somalia, Pakistan, and elsewhere, widely covered in the media but officially unacknowledged, may be his most lasting foreign policy legacy, and the most descriptive element of an "Obama Doctrine." The drone operations, inherited from Obama's predecessor and then expanded, came under serious scrutiny after the administration killed U.S. citizen and Al-Qaeda capo Anwar al-Awlaki in late 2011.

This week, the administration's legal justification for its policy of killing American citizens engaged in armed conflict with the U.S. surfaced in the form of a leaked 2011 Justice Department white paper. Writing for Foreign Policy, Rosa Brooks has a great breakdown of the core legal arguments, and the incredible discretion afforded to the administration in targeting and eliminating enemies.

The document is not a strategy paper; rather, it is a justification of the lawfulness of an array of actions the administration may take, or may have taken against U.S. citizens engaged in armed conflict against the U.S. It is a preemptive defense of a policy it knows will likely run into serious legal challenges somewhere down the line.

"The paper does not attempt to determine the minimum requirements necessary to render such an operation lawful; nor does it assess what might be required to render a lethal operation against a U.S. citizen lawful in other circumstances, including an operation against enemy forces on a traditional battlefield or an operation against a U.S. citizen who is not a senior operational leader of such forces. Here the Department of Justice concludes only that where the following three conditions are met, a U.S. operation using lethal force in a foreign country against a U.S. citizen who is a senior operational leader of al-Qu'ida or an associated force would be lawful..."

It is notable for its seemingly innocuous yet vague language. The three conditions are as follows: "an informed, high-level official of the U.S. government has determined that the targeted individual poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States; capture is infeasible, and the United States continues to monitor whether capture becomes feasible; and the operation would be conducted in a manner consistent with applicable law of war principles."

Words and phrases like "informed, high-level official," "imminent," and "applicable law of war principles" are what worry critics of the administration's justification. As Brooks points out, the document does a poor job of defining each term, thus leaving itself legal ground to which it can retroactively appeal in the face of some future legal challenge.

The administration said it will release additional classified memos expounding on the legal justification for targetting of U.S. citizens today. This comes on the heels of intense pressure from Congress and the day Senate confirmation hearings are set to begin for John Brennan's appointment to head the CIA.

Colombian Peace Negotiations

In November 2012, the Colombian Government sat down with representatives from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and began what has become a sincere, if tentative, process of negotiating an end to the longest running civil conflict in the hemisphere. Now into its third month, there are some signs of progress and some signs of imminent and increasing strain.

The talks, hosted by Cuba, revolve around five main points of contention: land distribution and development, demobilization, political participation for (future) ex-guerrillas, drug policy, and victims' rights. For now, negotiators are focused on the issue of land distribution policy, at once the root of the conflict and perhaps the closest thing to low hanging-fruit in these negotiations. Recent initiatives by the Colombian government have given a little ground in this area. Last year, the government launched a land restitution scheme aimed at putting land (around 2.5 million hectares in 2012) back into the hands of people who have fled the conflict.

In a country where approximately 1.15 percent of individuals control just over half of the country's farmland (according to the UNDP), there is clearly a long way to go. And, the going will likely get tougher; the government would like to distribute only fallow federal lands, while the FARC focuses on land concentrated in the hands of the conservative agro-export elite.

Writing for the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), Adam Isaacson notes that so far, both sides have come to the table in sincerity and have shown collegiality and respect for secrecy. There have been almost no leaks and despite the end of a unilateral FARC ceasefire on January 20 and resumption of hostilities, the parties have remained at the table. Interestingly, the government's refusal to declare or participate in any ceasefire (unlike during previous talks), may serve to strengthen the possibility of achieving a deal--particularly considering the fact that the FARC is considered to be the weakest it has been in decades.

Several potential obstacles could, however, derail the process. As negotiators continue to dig in to the land reform issue, the question of what land to redistribute and to whom will be tricky. WOLA's Isaacson observes that the country's largest association of cattle-ranchers has joined former president Alvaro Uribe in strenuously denouncing the negotiations. The two parties have not begun to address the question of political integration of ex-guerrillas, or the issue of drug policy reform--two issues that could raise the ire of many Colombian groups as well as the international community (the U.S. included).

The Santos administration has expressed its unwillingness to continue negotiations past November, 2013. As a result, the pace of the negotiations has become a real challenge. Further, assuming a deal is reached (far from a safe bet), implementation of the plan is an unknown. The government would like to put the resolution to a referendum while the FARC would prefer to institutionalize the outcome through a constitutional convention. Finally, the country's other long-standing rebel group, the National Liberation Army (ELN) has not been included in the negotiations. It is unclear whether the ELN could be folded into some kind of agreement, or if the two groups would have to start from scratch. The specter of disaffected farqueros defecting to the ELN or forming a splinter organization raises the important question of how consolidated the FARC really is: if a deal were reached, could they deliver?

Many Colombians as well as international observers (myself included) are cautiously optimistic. A large majority--71 percent--in a December 2012 Gallup poll indicated they supported the peace negotiations. When asked about their expectations for a deal though, they were somewhat ambivalent: only 43 percent expressed optimism.

Growing Pains(?)

Coming off the nightclub fire in the Brazilian city of Santa Maria on January 27th, Brazilians are facing a kind of collective reckoning reminiscent of what Americans went through after tragedies such as Newtown, Deep Water Horizon, or the 2010 Upper Big Branch mine disaster in West Virginia. The fire, a result of an indoor pyrotechnic display at a nightclub packed way over capacity, resulted in the deaths of now 237, with at least another hundred injured--likely permanently--from toxic smoke inhalation and burns.

This episode helps illustrate the gap between expectation and reality in a society that has come into its own in recent decades. Brazil, the "B" in the BRICS countries--a club of booming economies and rapidly developing societies--has experienced strong economic development, improved education and health indicators, and political transformation. The country's middle class has been growing impressively, and its political leaders have taken an increasingly important role in international diplomacy. The country looks forward to marking its arrival on the world stage with a flourish by hosting both the World Cup of soccer and the Summer Olympics in 2014 and 2016, respectively. In fact, Brazilians were preparing to celebrate 500 hundred days until World Cup kickoff, and their famous Carnival celebrations were to begin next week.

Instead, 22 municipalities have canceled Carnival, and the World Cup countdown celebration was put off.

A country becoming accustomed to "First World-ism" (excuse the expression) then, is rightly shocked and horrified by the needless and preventable deaths of so many. As the dust has settled, it appears that the club should not have been open at all. According to an article in this week's The Economist, the club's public health license and fire safety plan had expired. Whether the club was allowed to continue operating because of a bureaucratic mix up, or perhaps corruption, is unknown. What is clear though, is that despite the fact that Brazilians, especially poor favela-dwellers, experience small scale disasters frequently (landslides, crime sprees, bus crashes, etc.) the scale of this one seems to have changed the conversation around public safety.

This is a "never again" moment for Brazilians.

Brazilian states have a patchwork system of public safety regulations, and local municipalities are responsible for enforcement. Federal standards--introduced in 2007, but not passed--are now more likely to pass the congress. Whether this translates into improved capacity and follow through on oversight is another question.

The Economist notes that Brazilians can be proud of the response by firefighters, armed forces, and hospitals the night of the blaze (notwithstanding reports that security guards initially blocked the club exit thinking that people were trying to dodge paying their tabs). This will be of little consolation to those affected. Hopefully the heartbreak and outrage will be enough to break the inertia surrounding public safety and enforcement, and action will extend not just to college towns like Santa Maria, but to the deepest reaches of urban favelas and rural communities alike.