Syria (Part I)

Courtesy of Freedom House

The uprising in Syria hit a milestone this month, passing the two year mark, and despite regular proclamations that Bashar Al-Assad's grip on power is reaching a tipping point, a major change in the status quo seems unlikely. The public discussion and debate over the situation in the Levant and role of the US in Syria has been strikingly muted in my opinion, so I thought I'd take this opportunity to make some observations while trying to flesh out my own position on the issue.

While I am admittedly not a specialist on the region, I think the nature of our discussion over the "Syria Question" as well as the Obama administration's maneuvering on the issue have been striking. First, to put the conflict in perspective, the death toll in Syria is believed to have passed 70,000 and produced nearly three million refugees (one million external), out of a country of roughly 20 million, in two years. Peru's conflict during the 1980s and 90s took about 69,000 lives in 20-ish years and El Salvador's extinguished about 75,000 in 12 years. The Balkanisation of the former Yugoslavia resulted in around 140,000 deaths over eight years. The 2011 uprising in Libya killed anywhere between several hundred and 25,000 (there is no official tally, though most estimates range in the 2,000-6,000 range) in nine months. Compared (crudely) to these recent internal armed conflicts, this one is extremely violent.

In economic terms, it is becoming increasingly clear that the conflict may render the country a basket case, leaving those who have fled nothing to return to. According to Al Jazeera,

"In 2010 before the uprising, Syria's gross domestic product was valued at about $57.5bn. Now it has fallen to just under $30bn - a drop of about 35 percent. The Syrian pound (LS) has lost about half its value. It used to trade at about LS47 to the dollar, it now goes for around 85, and well above 90 on the black market. And in terms of infrastructure, homes, roads and bridges across Syria will need rebuilding. One in five schools is damaged or destroyed and one in every three hospitals can no longer provide services."

To date, the US has had almost no role in Syria--no "kinetic action," no "leading from behind" (though there are reports of US weapons trainers working with rebels). The Obama administration has provided around $60 million in direct aid--all in the form of humanitarian relief, satellite telephones, radios, broadcasting equipment, computers, and survival equipment--but has shied away from providing or even facilitating the provision of weapons to Syrian armed opposition. In fact, some report that the administration has actively sought to prevent weapons from reaching portions of the armed "Rebels."

The biggest question preventing more direct or robust interaction is the question "who are the rebels?" Policy makers have been exceedingly cautious towards the Syrian opposition, who's only defining feature aside from its hatred of Assad is, judging from most reports, its fragmentation and inability to form a coherent leadership structure. Americans are rightly concerned with the complexity of the situation; Syria is not Libya (...is not Iraq, is not Afghanistan, is not Vietnam...). Syria is much bigger, has a much more sophisticated civil and military infrastructure, and is far more fractured along racial and ethnic lines. So, any foreign involvement is likely to kick up a "hornet's nest" of ethnic and sectarian tensions that would doom any reconstruction effort, the argument goes.

But is this a cop-out? Not quite. Hopefully, it is a thoughtful and humble, if lengthy appraisal of the situation by American policy makers. An article in the Atlantic quotes an anonymous US official saying, "The United States has a long history of picking winners and losers based on the guy who speaks English well...It's just trying to learn the lessons and be humble. We don't have perfect visibility into the situation. Interjecting that forcefully in an armed way has huge risk." Where was this prudence in the build up to the Iraq invasion?--I know not. Yet, I suspect that like the Iraq invasion, where there is a will there is a way. In other words, because in foreign policy issues "elites" (elected officials, diplomats, pundits, etc.) tend to have an outsize influence on public opinion (more so than domestic policy), if there was a serious interest in intervening among Democrats in the White House or Senate, or Republicans in the House, they would have made the case. With a few exceptions, no one has. Whether this is a remnant of Obama's reluctance to deal in foreign affairs during election season, our preoccupation with economic and budget woes, or the waning of the "War on Terror" narrative is unclear.

To boot, the American public is certainly not demanding their leaders get involved. Polling shows that there is no appetite in the US for involvement in Syria. According to a March YouGov poll, Americans oppose providing anything other than "non-lethal support" by a margin of 45 to 16 percent for. Our French and especially British allies are also reluctant, with about 59 percent of UK respondents opposing more active support for the rebels, including supplying arms.

Lest we forget, opponents of intervention in Iraq were quick to recall that the US supported Saddam's war against Iran in the 1980's, providing weapons and support that were eventually turned against us. It seems some in Washington have concluded that the "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" approach can backfire. Otherwise, it is likely that they would be more willing to hold their nose and support some of the shadowy groups working to overthrowing one of Iran's most important allies.

So then, are we just learning our lessons? I'm not so optimistic. Writing at The Guardian, YouGov's Joel Faulkner Rogers traces the swinging pendulum of American foreign policy in 2nd half of the 20th century--which swings (with some regularity) between idealist internationalism and principled isolationism. More than anything, I think the situation is conveniently complex and uncertain, and the potential effect of Syria on our "national interests" (as defined by those who might otherwise make the case) are sufficiently cloudy to incentivize the kind of cautious isolationism we're seeing within the foreign policy community. Rogers goes on though, to make the case that perhaps we've "over learned" the lessons of Iraq. I think there is some merit to this. Some would say that we over learned the lessons of Somalia while Rwanda burned.

While I obviously agree with the need for caution in considering putting American "blood and treasure" at risk overseas, I agree that we can't make the same assumptions and shouldn't compare Iraq and Syria too closely. We don't need to approach every scenario as a unilateral, Iraq- or Vietnam-style full scale invasion. Except for the occasional mention of a no fly zone, a la Libya, I don't hear much discussion of alternative scenarios such as an Arab League-led effort. Meanwhile, Turkey is a reluctant leader, Israel is in fortress mode, and the Gulf states are eagerly arming certain (apparently unsavory) factions of the opposition while Iran flies through complacent Iraqi skies to deliver arms to Assad . Of course, it doesn't help that we ourselves don't have much in the way of a clear "mission"--it isn't clear all Syrians do either (Foreign Policy Magazine had a great piece on the way Syrians themselves are maneuvering to protect their own interests, waiting to see how the war proceeds before throwing their lot in with either of the several sides in the conflict.). We think we know we want Assad out (which smacks of "regime change" to the Chinese and Russians), but then what?

Then what, indeed. Part II, later.

Salvadoran Maras tighten links with Mexican Zetas

A new report issued by the International Assessment and Strategy Center is making the claim that the MS-13 gang based in El Salvador has tightened its links to the hyper-violent Zetas of Mexico.

While the presence of Mexican cartels in Central America is not necessarily a new phenomenon, this new kind of collaboration is unprecedented. Whereas the maras, specifically the MS-13, traditionally provided a kind of fee for service protection racket that benefited transportistas associated with, but not members of the cartels, it seems they are now taking over some of the enterprises themselves, on behalf of the Zetas. These include, but are not limited to drug trafficking, local drug sales, and human trafficking.

Doug Farah, the report's author, argues that the MS-13 have taken advantage of a nearly year old truce between them and the M-18 gang to reorganize and insert themselves into the political arena (by delivering blocs of votes to pliable politicians in return for favors) and more directly into the international narcotics trade that has shifted dramatically to Central America and Mexico in the past decade.

This development is particularly worrying considering the fact that the Zetas themselves once served as the "enforcers" for another group, the Gulf Cartel, before branching off on their own. Once affiliates of military special forces in Mexico and Guatemala, the Zetas are now recruiting the most "talented" gun-slingers in the Salvadoran maras.

So far, we haven't seen the same level of cooperation between gangs and cartels in Guatemala or Honduras. This is largely due to the fact that in those much larger countries, cartels have an easier time moving their product themselves and don't need to cooperate with gangsters who are often regarded by the cartels as amateurish and undisciplined. In El Salvador though, the MS-13 is much more organized and hierarchical and controls a larger portion of the highly urbanized country, compared with the large swaths of rural Guatemala and Honduras in which the gangs have no presence.

Some Central Americans are taking things into their own hands. In the face of largely overwhelmed and incompetent (not to mention corrupt) security forces and some of the highest homicide rates on earth for much of the past 15 years, observers are seeing a rise in vigilante style justice in the region. For example, in 2011, Guatemalan mobs and self-defense groups lynched at least 44 suspected criminals--and these are just the cases reported and investigated by the police, which constitute a small minority of the total murders committed. The actual number of extra-judicial killings either by individuals, mobs, or private security guards, is likely much higher in Guatemala and neighboring countries.

A Gallup poll released last month shows that Central Americans widely hold youth gangs (including maras) responsible for crime in the region. In El Salvador, 67 percent blame gangs for crime, whereas in Guatemala and Honduras, 43 percent and 34 percent, respectively, blame the gangs. In the latter two countries, where narcotraffickers and organized crime seem to operate more independently of the gangs, respondents are the most likely to blame narcotraffickers in addition to gangs. Worryingly, many also see the police as one of the biggest problems with regards to crime. Eighteen percent of Hondurans blame the police themselves for crime! While other Central Americans are less likely to blame the police directly, almost no one (with the notable exception of Nicaragua) trusts the police: 84 percent of Hondurans, 76 percent of Guatemalans, and 69 percent of Salvadorans said they do not trust the police in their country.

Good readings on Chavez, Chavismo, and the future of Venezuela

Like many Latin America enthusiasts, I've found Venezuela's Hugo Chavez to be one of the most interesting and important figures in the politics of the Western Hemisphere in generations, for better or worse. His death this week may (or may not) be the end of an era, but his legacy will likely continue to have huge impacts on politics, economics, and society in Venezuela--if not throughout the region--for years to come.

Rather than pontificating on the virtues and vices of his tenure at Venezuela's helm, I thought I'd leave it up to some more qualified writers. Here you go...

Juan Forero has a good primer of the questions swirling around Chavez' absence on the Washington Post.

The New York Times has a piece focusing on el Comandante's chosen successor, Nicolas Maduro and his potential relationship with the U.S. He notes that while Maduro has already started to adopt some of Chavez' personal quirks, including his strident anti-Americanism, others think he may prove to be a more pragmatic leader.

The Washington Office on Latin America's David Smilde has a good Q&A on the Venezuelan Politics and Human Rights blog, as well as a thoughtful take on the (hopefully) permanent inclusion of Venezuela's most marginalized in the country's political system--despite continued struggles.

This editorial on The Guardian has a brief look at the challenges Chavez' own oil-fueled largess may leave for his own country--especially the poor urban masses who so benefited from it.

The BBC provides a profile of Chavez, from his training as an army paratrooper, to the 1992 coup, to the presidency. The Guardian has another, here.

Writing on The Atlantic, Francisco Toro takes a serious look at the dark side of Chavez harassment and bullying of dissident voices, especially within his own movement. He's right that while many in the U.S. may have gotten a kick out of Chavez calling President Bush the devil, or blaming the absence of life on Mars, or the earthquake in Haiti on American-style capitalism or secret "tectonic" weaponry, respectively, this stuff wasn't so amusing to many Venezuelans. He writes, "This image of El Comandante as a mere eccentric drove those of us who witnessed the progressive disintegration of Venezuela's democratic institutions around the bend. A rogue looks a lot less lovable when laughing at him can cost you your job, your property, your livelihood, your freedom."

The Miami Herald's Andres Oppenheimer compares Chavez' legacy to that of Argentina's Peron. I agree that Chavez is likely to be little more than a cultural icon beyond Venezuela from here on out, and that Chavez has not been the only one who's helped the poor (Peru and Chile--hardly bastions of leftist government in the last decade--did even more to alleviate poverty than Chavez). But, his memory will certainly prove useful to all sorts of electoral groups vying for power--whether on the left or right. I think this has already begun to happen; Chavez' opponent in October's election, Henrique Capriles, seemed forced to accept the continued existence of many of Chavez' most popular social programs. This could last for decades.

Al Jazeera English has a handful of op-eds looking at various aspects of Chavez' legacy. Janvieve Williams Comrie looks at the impacts of Chavez on race relations and the improved position of many ethnic and racial minorities, both in Venezuela and throughout the region. This is one of the least talked about aspects of Chavismo, especially in the U.S. media, but may be one of Chavez' most important and long-lasting impacts.

Mark Weisbrot, of the Center for Economic and Policy Research, has a favorable view of Chavez' legacy on poverty in the country and for Latin American independence from the U.S. Manuela Picq and Belen Fernandez also write (mostly sympathetically) on the ability of Chavez to incorporate Venezuela's long marginalized lower classes into the country's politics and economy. Particularly interesting are Picq's thoughts the rise of the Left in Latin America during the past 14 years or so. I think Chavez' role in this respect is often exaggerated (I give more credit to moderate leftists in some Mexican states, and to Brazil's "Lula"), but not unimportant.

Also writing on Al Jazeera, Mike Allison, a Central America expert, has some insights into how Chavez' death might impact politics in the region and how Chavez the figure might compare to other Latin American figures such as Allende, Arbenz, or Peron. I'd also recommend reading Allison's blog; he's prolific and really insightful.

The Christian Science Monitor's blog, the Latin American Monitor, has a handful of posts on the subject of Chavez and his succession, one of which focuses specifically on the character of Nicolas Maduro, who has already begun to "channel his inner Chavez."

Another good blog, Bloggings by Boz, looks at the possibility of Venezuela (indeed, Latin America) moving beyond the timeless figure of the caudillo. This is especially good reading for gringos (myself included), who may be more prone to look at Latin American politics and leadership through jaded eyes, wondering who (read: which new caudillo) will replace Chavez.

If anyone has any good suggested reading on the future of the Venezuelan party system, I'd love to see it; I think this is one of the more uncertain and unexplored issues, beyond the simple question of who will govern in Venezuela. Chavez came to power following the collapse of one of Latin America's most durable two-party systems in the 1980s and 90s. His career has obviously destroyed any remnants of this punto fijo system--so, where to now?

Paso a paso - progress on Mexican judicial reform

Garrison Photography, Boise, ID

The Wilson Center recently released a good report on the progress of Mexico's judicial reform, which began back in 2008. I think this is one of the more important reform efforts under way in Mexico, for a variety of reasons, but especially because these reforms--if done well--could hugely improve the legitimacy, efficiency, and protection of basic civil rights within the judicial system. This in turn could have a positive effect on the country's ability to combat organized crime and drug trafficking, as well as the deeper, associated social ills such as poverty, inequality, and corruption.

The reforms contained in the 2008 legislation are broad and ambitious. They seek to move from an inquisitorial, European-style system to an accusatorial system similar to the British and American common law system. What's the difference? In the simplest sense, the former system, a descendant of the Napoleonic code, is oriented around finding out the facts of a case whereas the latter system focuses more on the parties caught up in the case, oriented more towards restorative, rather than punitive justice.

The accusatorial system has spread rapidly throughout the Americas in recent decades and, where implemented correctly, tends (or hopes) to result in greater protections for individuals involved in trials (plaintiffs and defendants alike); more public and transparent proceedings; and greater efficiency stemming from the use of alternative sentences and plea bargaining.

These are certainly some of the goals of the Mexican reform, which, like many Latin American systems, has been strongly criticized for its mistreatment of civilians, its lack of transparency, and a tendency to create huge bureaucratic burdens. In response, the groups behind the reform law included improvements in the treatment of victims and defendants, including a presumption of innocence and access to qualified public defenders (a novelty in Mexico); limitations on pre-trial detention procedures guaranteed by a judge; and oral proceedings at all stages of a trial.

The reforms have also been subject to some criticism, though, by groups opposed to the practice of arraigo. This procedure allows police and prosecutors to detain individuals suspected of involvement with organized crime for up to 80 days to allow officials to gather evidence and build a case--often an obstacle in prosecuting savvy, well-connected individuals associated with the drug trade. Unfortunately, the practice has been widely abused, and in practice often results in the use of torture to build cases against a wide array of individuals suspected of activity relating to a loose definition of "organized crime."

The new measure mandated the federal government and the 32 states (including the Federal District) to pass and implement enacting legislation by 2016. Enactment has been slow but steady through 2012. While 22 jurisdictions have now passed enacting legislation (strong progress), in practice the reforms are being adopted at a tortuous pace, and progress varies considerably among and within enacting states. Only 12 have implemented their reforms, with only three having fully done so.

This is a tall order, for sure. Reforms require changing not just forms and procedures country wide, but also improving and updating the legal education system while training police, prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, and clerks. The reforms also face ample political challenges, in addition to technical and resource constraints. There remains strong opposition from sectors concerned that the reforms are too soft on crime, or go too far in protecting criminals. There is also a strong and legitimate debate as to whether the proposed system necessarily will result in a more "just" system. President Pena Nieto has signaled his intent to press forward with implementation, though action at the federal level has been slow.

Bangladeshi International Crimes Tribunal Comes Up Wanting

Bangladesh's war crimes tribunal, set up in 2010 to investigate atrocities committed during the country's violent 1971 split from Pakistan, is igniting political and sectarian tensions that have resulted in over 75 deaths in the past month.

 

The bout of protests, which began peacefully, stem from a series of sentences handed down by the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) against a handful of leaders of the country's Jamaat-e-Islami party (Bangladesh's most important Islamist party) beginning in January. Elements of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) participated in the killing of up to 3 million Bangladeshis and the torture and rape of many hundreds of thousands more during the nine month war of separation from Pakistan (some place the toll closer to 300-500 thousand; Pakistanis argue the number is closer to 25-50,000). The Tribunal, a domestic court, despite its name, handed down its first sentence--death, in absentia--against former JI leader, Abul Kamal Azad.

Protesters demanding the death sentence
for Kader Mollah, February 2013 

Things became really heated though, when the ICT sentenced a second JI leader, Quader Mollah to life in prison for his role in the conflict on February 5th. In the following weeks, tens of thousands of Bangladeshis protested the finding, demanding a death sentence. On February 17, the Bangladeshi Parliament obliged, not only allowing the state to appeal the sentence in hopes of winning a harsher punishment for Mollah, but also paving the way for the ICT to try groups, not just individuals, in association with the atrocities of 1971--JI being the principle target.

The past week has seen the worst of the violence, following the February 28 sentence of another JI leader, vice-president Delwar Hossain Sayedee, to death for murder, religious persecution, and rape. JI called a two-day strike over the weekend in response to the killing by police of four partisan youths last week.

Set up by the ruling Awami League, who campaigned on the issue in 2009, the ICT has received strong criticism from legal and human rights observers, who say it has been used to attack the opposition JI and its allies in the Bangladesh Nationalist Party. International observers, who initially backed the Tribunal, have backed such claims, and added their own complaints of harassment, intimidation, and illegal cooperation between judges, prosecutors, and the government.

 

Few international observers consider the trials clean and fair. Along with complaints of a tainted system, the Parliament's apparent eagerness to appease public opinion, and the recent wave of violence (mostly by the police, though not all) seem to support fears that the government is merely using the ICT to bludgeon the opposition. In total, nine JI leaders have been or are being tried, with decisions on the remaining six expected soon. Guilty verdicts, which are expected for each of the remaining individuals, could result in the entire leadership of the JI and several from the Bangladesh Nationalist Party being put to death by the end of the year.

 

Far from providing the catharsis that was expected at the outset, these tainted trials may be tearing Bangladesh apart.  

 

Things are expected to get worse, as several more senior JI figures are slated to receive their sentences over the coming weeks. As a supporter of efforts--especially by domestic, rather than international courts--to reckon with the sins of the past, I worry that a botched attempt at justice may weigh on similar efforts elsewhere in the world by providing a false example of the dangers of "looking back" or "digging into the past." This would be especially convenient for elements in countries currently seeking to achieve transitional justice, who argue that no good can come of prosecution for crimes of the past.

 

The Rise of the Favela

Author's photo

The Latin American Monitor (Christian Science Monitor) has an interesting post this week about Brazil's rising "favela consumer class." RioGringa, the author, notes that around 65 percent of favela (a term for urban Brazilian slums) residents are now considered middle class. This "C" class, in Brazilian parlance, constitutes about 12 million people--about the size of Illinois or Pennsylvania, the 5th and 6th most populous states in the U.S.--and earn around $28 billion a year, which the author compares to the entire GDP of Bolivia.


Riding a tide of strong national growth and aggressive social development policy under the PT (Worker's Party), favela residents have begun to replace the image of gang-ruled no man's lands with that of a developing, even thriving heart of a Brazilian renaissance. RioGringa points to the increasing access to goods, especially durable goods, for favela residents as an indicator of a growing middle class. Over half of residents now have washing machines and 40 percent have computers. Much of this urban boom comes as a result of easier access to credit, underwritten by government programs like the Growth Acceleration Program or Bolsa Familia.

 

 

This boom in hardware and appliances is stretching an already tenuous infrastructure in many favelas. Touring several favelas in 2009, I remember being overwhelmed by the sketchy mass of cables and wires, jerry-rigged by handy residents to connect their new TVs and washers to the grid (see image). The challenge will be formalizing the tenuous (and sometimes illegal) connections between favela residents and the economy and infrastructure; this means improving access to sewage and utilities, land tenure, and public services like education, health care, and security.

 

 

 

 

 

Conditional Cash Transfers and School Attendance

Flickr user: kinderpate

The World Bank released a paper last month looking at the effects of Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programs on school attendance in rural Burkina Faso. As I've looked at similar programs in Latin America, and am generally a proponent of such schemes, I thought I'd share a few interesting points.

CCTs have been growing in popularity throughout the developing world and especially in Latin America--particularly Mexico and Brazil. The idea behind these schemes is to develop long-term human capacity in the form of increased nutritional, health, and educational outcomes, and to break the inter-generational cycle of poverty that afflicts implementing countries.

The "Conditional" in the CCT theoretically has a number of benefits, both for donors and recipients. For donors, many have remarked that conditionalities make cash transfers (from governments to citizens) more palatable to politicians. On the other hand, conditionalities provide a mechanism by which recipients are incentivized to do things like send their kids to school (rather than work or beg) and get medical checkups and immunization for women and young children. Some programs have additional benefits such as providing female heads of household with increased independence or providing a source of income security that allows families to access credit or purchase durable goods (Abhifit Banerjee and Esther Duflo's book Poor Economics has a great section on the difficulties poor people face in accessing credit and the benefits of income security for development).

The World Bank study isolates one particular theoretical benefit of CCTs, and asks to what extent conditional versus unconditional cash transfers really increase school attendance. The results were interesting; CCTs and UCTs (unconditional...) had similar positive impacts on enrollment for "children who are traditionally favored by parents for school participation, including boys, older children, and higher ability children." These are children that parents may "prioritize" with regards to obtaining education; parents already want to send them to school. So, cash transfers--with or without conditionalities attached--help relieve the burden (or opportunity costs) of sending these kids to school.

Where the conditional transfers excelled however, was in improving enrollment of what the authors called "marginal children"--kids who are less likely than the first group to go to school, or who go to school less often. These include girls, younger children, and children with lower abilities. For these children, cash benefits led to a statistically significant increase in enrollment of over 20 percent for girls, 37 percent for younger children, and 36 percent for low ability children, compared to the average enrollment for these groups. UCTs, on the other hand, saw either a statistically insignificant increase in enrollment, or a much smaller enrollment for these groups.

In other words, CCTs seem to excel in encouraging school attendance among the most marginalized groups of marginalized populations, and provide a pretty good bang for the buck.

Keep in mind, these results obtain in Burkina Faso, a relatively small rural country in the West African Sahel. I would be interested to see a comparative look at CCTs in more urbanized countries, or geographically larger countries, for example. In addition, this study defines educational outcomes mostly in terms of enrollment and attendance; education observers in this country well know that educational outcomes rest on a variety of other factors, not the least of which include the quality of the schools and teachers or the availability of textbooks and classroom technology, for example. These elements generally lie within the supply side of the educational attainment equation, however, and it is becoming ever more apparent that CCTs at least have a strong and positive impact on the demand side of things.